# Reconstructing the Past:
Journal of Historical Studies

## Volume 3
## №4
## December 2025

**BAKU-2025**

## RECONSTRUCTING THE PAST: *JOURNAL OF HISTORICAL STUDIES*

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Kind regards,
*Professor Hussein Baghirov*
*Founder of the Western Caspian University*

# THE RESETTLEMENT POLICY OF TSARIST RUSSIA IN MUGHAN AS A PART OF THE COLONIAL POLICY (THE LATE 19TH CENTURY AND EARLY 20TH CENTURY)

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**ABSTRACT**

This article analyzes the resettlement policy implemented by Tsarist Russia in the Mughan region of Northern Azerbaijan in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as one of the principal instruments of imperial colonial governance. The study demonstrates that the settlement of the Russian population in Mughan was not merely the outcome of agrarian or social reforms, but rather an integral part of a strategic plan aimed at altering the region's ethnic composition, strengthening political control, and establishing an imperial stronghold along the southern frontiers. The article identifies three main stages in the settlement process in Mughan: the forced relocation of religious sectarian communities between 1830 and 1860; the formation of a new model of colonization between 1888 and 1902 through the establishment of Petropavlovka and the introduction of initial irrigation projects; and, finally, the period between 1902 and 1916, during which mass resettlement acquired a systematic, state-led character within the framework of Stolypin's agrarian reforms. Based on archival sources, it is shown that during this period more than fifty Russian villages were founded in the Javad district, and over twenty thousand Russian peasants were resettled in the region. Drawing on the views of N. Shavrov and other imperial ideologues, the study examines plans to transform Mughan into a "fully Russian governorate," the instrumentalization of the Russian population within policies of Christianization and Russification, and the military-strategic significance of the region in the context of the Ottoman and Iranian borders. The article further demonstrates that the allocation of land, weapons, financial assistance, and administrative privileges to Russian settlers generated tensions with the local population, leading to the depopulation of certain villages and the marginalization of indigenous communities. In conclusion, the article argues that Russian resettlement in Mughan was not a case of simple agrarian colonization, but rather a deliberate policy of demographic and political engineering pursued by the empire. These settlements subsequently became one of the main support bases of anti-national armed forces in the region during the years 1917–1919.

**INTRODUCTION**

 One of the constituent parts of the multifaceted colonial policy carried out by Tsarist Russia in Northern Azerbaijan is the resettlement process of Russians through various stages. It should be noted that even in the 18th century and later throughout the 19th century immediately after the Turkmenchay tragedy, the mass resettlement of ethnic Armenians was the result of "velikorus" chauvinist, Russian-Slavic bigotry, but the specification (particularity) of the resettlement of the Russian-speaking population varies from time to time. The article presented by us is dedicated to the settlement of Russian peasants in the Mughan region of Azerbaijan at the beginning of the 20th century. The settlement of Mughan with Russians, which became serious since the 80s of the 19th century and became widespread at the beginning of the 20th century, especially during Stolypin reform, was studied by N.Shavrov, M.B.Məmmədzadə, D.Ismayilzadeh, F. Baghirov, H. Verdiyeva and other authors.

        In their works, the founders of the Republic of Azerbaijan paid attention to the resettlement policy as one of the main directions of the policy of Russification and Christianization of Tsarist Russia. M.B. Mammadzadeh in his work "National Movement of Azerbaijan" also draws attention to the reason why Russians did not migrate en masse at the beginning of the 19th century: tsarism needed a social group to support it. However, tsarism did not trust the agha and bey clans either. To get out of this situation, the investigative teams sent by Russia to Azerbaijan proposed various ways. The most adequate (favorable) of them was to take Russian peasants to Azerbaijan and settle them in the places occupied from the khans. However, the famous Paskevich, who knows Azerbaijan well, considered this proposal very dangerous for Russia. According to his opinion about this proposal, the captive and slave status of the Russian peasant

belonging to the Russian nation, the ruler and conqueror, will look ridiculous next to the free-living Azerbaijani peasant, and for the Russian landlords, who are the backbone of Russian tsarism would create a fearful situation"(Məmmədzadə, 1992, p. 16).

 It is the right approach, it should be related to the components and results of the process of moving Russian peasants to remote areas, abolition of the serf system at the end of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century. At the beginning of the 19th century, the current socio-political and economic situation in Russia did not allow this. At the beginning of the 20th century, the resettlement of Russians was a new stage of the policy of Russification, it was a part of Stolyp's reaction. This was the period when "the ideologist and implementer of the 1907 reaction, Prime Minister Stolypin of Russia, used all reactionary methods to extinguish the national awakening in Azerbaijan.

As it is known, population transfers were part of the colonial policy of Tsarist Russia and had the purpose of Russification and Christianization. Siberia and the Volga, Poland and Ukraine, Central Asia and the Caucasus are among such geographies. The migration of ethnic Armenians and Russians to Azerbaijan during the Russian invasions is essentially the same. However, the research allows us to say that the ethno-demographic policy of the empire has changed in terms of historical stage and period, and has a far-sighted aim in terms of political and economic. The beginning of the 20th century is one of those times. In the article presented by us, I have tried to reveal the essence and philosophy of this hateful policy on the example of the Northern Mughan region. It is clear from the historical literature that the relocation of the Russian-speaking population to Mughan was carried out in several stages. The 30s-60s of the 19th century can be considered as the first period, the period from 1888 to 1902 as the second stage, and finally the years 1902-1913 as the third stage. In the 30s-60s of the 19th century, heretics or sectarists (Russian sectarians) peasants who were transferred to Mughan: Malakans, Dukhobars, Priguns, Subbotniks and other Russians were actually exiled to Mughan as criminals of various composition. The colonialists, who viewed the Azerbaijani people as criminals, treated the sectarians who took an opposing position against the official Pro-Slavic Christian Church from the same position and transferred them to distant colonies. Hajar Verdiyeva writes about the relocation of this period: "The main aim of the resettlement policy was the settlement of Russian sectarians in Azerbaijan. This process was especially strengthened in the 30s of the 19th century. In those years, according to the Russian historian N.A. Borozdin, a researcher of that period, they were collected from all over Russia and deported to Transcaucasia. Molokans, Dukhobors, Khlists, Subbotniks, Priguns, Skops - they were all sent here. If in 1841 the number of Molokans of both sexes in the Caspian region was 3,977, in the mid-1940s the number of only men reached 2,667. In 1844, the total number of sectarians in northern Azerbaijan was 3369 men and 3922 women" (Verdiyeva, 1994, p. 85). Val - 1834, Novogolovka - 1844, Prishib - 1840, Nikolayevka - 1841, Astrakhanka - 1842, etc., were the first Russian settlements established in Mughan (Lankaran district). Russian peasants who were transferred to these regions were mainly sectarists. The process of migration from Russia to Azerbaijan in 1830-1880 was spontaneous and organizationally weak and unsystematic. In the cameral image of 1873 the total number of Russian heretical settlers in Javad district is 118 yards, including 732 people. 408 of them was men, 324 of them was woman. In the information given by S.Alifin based on the data of 1885 we see a decrease in the number of Russian heretical settlers, total number of people were shown 259 people, 135 men and 124 women was consist of these people. This population was shown in 86 yards In fact, Petropavlovka, which was founded in 1888, was the first Russian settlement created in Mughan and its population consisted of only Russian-Orthodox peasants. Azerbaijani historians D.Ismailzadeh (Ismailzade, 1962, pp. 3–15; Ismailzade, 1971, pp. 38–46; Ismailzade, 1976, pp. 18–31), F. Baghirov (Bagirov, 2009), H. Verdieva (Verdieva, 1999) and others have studied the most diverse directions of the colonial resettlement policy of the Russian Empire in Azerbaijan (including resettlement measures carried out in Mughan). Thus, in the article, on the basis of archival documents, as well as the works of Russian and Azerbaijani authors, the essence of the relocation of Russian villages to Mughan and historical periods is considered.

### 1. Solving the Shahsevan "problem" in Mughan and a new stage of Russian emigration

We believe that new prospects for Russian relocation emerged after 1885, when the migration of shahsevens from Southern Azerbaijan to Mughan was blocked by a brutal shooting; we have devoted a separate work to this topic.

The years 1888-1902 can be considered as this new phase of Russian migrations. The location of northern Mughan on the border with Iran (with southern Mughan - S.I.) and the construction of water canals on the banks of Kura, Araz and Bolgarchay after the expulsion of the Shahsevans in 1885 encouraged the mass settlement of Russians in Mughan. F.Baghirov writes about the mentioned history of settlement of Russian peasants: "With the exception of the Russian village of Petropavlovka, which was established in 1888, active Russian settlement of this place began in 1901-1902. The creation of an irrigation system led to the establishment of new Russian settlements" (Baghirov, 2009, p. 33) It should be noted that a number of villages were already founded by 1902. New Nikolayevka, New Aleksandrovka and others are of this type.

Thus, as mentioned above, in 1888, the Russian settlement of Petropavlovka was established near the place where Araz meets Kura. N. Shavrov presents the history of the establishment of the village in detail: "In 1887, during the administration of the country by Dondukov-Korsakov, 70 families gathered from different regions of Vladikavkaz came to the city of Javad, which was chosen as the Uezd center since 1868." With the permission of Prince Dondukov-Korsakov, 70 Russian families settled in Petropavlovka, a settlement choosen for them, a short distance from Javad. It resembled an empty desert except for the 26 villages located there. In 1896, as a result of the flooding of the Araz near the village of Saatli, the new Araz was formed, which flowed into the Kyzylagac Bay. As a result of this natural disaster in the summer months of 1896, the fertile lands created as a result of the flooding of the Nile in Egypt created fertile conditions for the development of agriculture in Mughan. In fact, the colonial local authorities did nothing to protect the population in 1896, even though the local population had built dams and other defenses to protect their farmlands from flooding. The location of the Mil-Mughan plains on the border with Iran gave it a strategic-geographical position. F. Baghirov writes: "The establishment of individual Russian settlements in Mughan dates back to the 1960s. If we do not count the Petropavlovka Russian settlement established in 1888, then there was a long pause in the resettlement of Russians to Mughan until 1901-1902." (Baghirov, 2009, p. 28).

In Petropavlovka, each family was given 27 desyats of land. Additionally, 1,960 desyatins and then 3,531 desyatins of land were leased as originally planned. In exchange for this, the Russian families had to build a water canal from the Araz River to Gobu. In the first years, residents who were not able to adapt to local conditions had a lot of difficulty. They did not get along with the local population, they faced diseases, poverty reigned among them. Over time, they adapted to local conditions. Now the people of Petropavlovka are engaged in the most diverse field of agriculture. Life was bustling in the village and 92 families lived there. The Pristav's residence is located here. In addition, a fish warden, a doctor, a veterinarian, a water engineer, an inspector of water transport on the Kura River, a school, a church, a weekly market, a control station for ships sailing on the Kura River were located in Petropavlovka. N. Shavrov writes that: "Recently, a telegraph-communication bureau has also been established. In 1898, Russian settlements named Novo-Nikolayevka and Novo-Aleksandrovka were built in Mughan." During the spring flooding of the Araz River, the creation of a fertile agricultural environment allowed the soil to become suitable for cultivation. The process of economic appropriation of the Mughan region went parallel with the construction of the irrigation system created here.

The Russian settlement of Novo Nikolayevka was built (in 1898) around the villages of Gara-Nuru,

Haji Hasanli. It was located 12 km southeast of Petropavlovka, along the Sarajalar stream(Baghirov, 2009, p. 33). The first inhabitants of this Russian settlement were gathered from Yekaterinoslav, Chersonesus, Bessarabia and Podolsky governorates. In the earlier stages, the settlers suffered greatly from the lack of water. However, the situation changed after the mission of water transport engineer Mayevsky to Mughan. With his initiative and leadership, the Saradzhalyar (Sarıcalı) water canal, 5 versts long, was built. The cost of the channel was 2000 rubles. The construction of the aqueduct changed the life of the residents of Novo-Nikolayevka. He gave impetus to the development of cotton farming. N. Shavrov writes: "Currently, 152 families and 792 people (Russians) live here." The main occupation of the village population was cotton growing. The village had a cotton field specialist, a church, a parochial school, a beekeeping enterprise, and stables. The Russian settlement of Nikolayevka played the role of the main center for the expansion of cotton farming in Mughan, spreading this field. At the same time, the village of Novo-Nikolayevka played a special role in the development of beekeeping and cattle-breeding in Mughan, as well as in the creation of pig farming.

N. Shavrov indicates the establishment of the Russian village of Novo-Aleksandrovka in 1901. He writes: "The 3rd Russian settlement in Mughan (after Petropavlovka and Novo-Nikolayevka) was built on the left bank of one of the tributaries of Novo-Aleksandrovka-Yeni Araz, where this tributary meets Gur-Gur Gobu, around the villages of Samad Khan and Suleyman Khan. Residents of the village come from the southern governates of Russia. The water supply of residents of the Russian settlement of Novo-Aleksandrovka was re-established in 1902. A 5-verst long water canal was built, which is the basis of the Golitsin system created in Northern Mughan. Novo Aleksandrovka is located 12 versts east of Novo Nikolayevka and has 89 families. In total, 504 Russians live in the village. The land system of these villages was rebuilt in 1903. 9665 desyatins of land were allocated to them." (Baghirov, 2009, p. 41).

Some authors indicate the history of the Russian settlements of Novo-Nikolayevka and Aleksandrovka with certain differences. H. Verdiyeva indicates that Nikolayevka was founded in 1902 and Aleksandrovka in 1904(Verdieva, 1999, p. 213) .

N. Shavrov notes that Aleksansdrovka was built in 1901(Shavrov, 1911). F. Bagirov writes that both villages were founded in 1898(Baghirov, 2009, p. 292). The first Russian peasants who were transferred to Mughan were in great difficulty. The main food products were the fish they caught from Araz - mainly: salmon, wels catfish, and watermelon, melon. They could not bear the hot weather there, they suffered from various diseases. Some of the first displaced people returned. The inhabitants of Petropavlovka town were almost in despair for a long time (for 15 years). After the construction of the Gurgur irrigation canal, the situation changed for the better. Gur-gur ditch laid the foundation of the network of water ditches called Golitsyn. The flood and overfloods that occurred in Mughan in 1896 were regarded as an unfortunate event among the people. The Araz caused a flood near the village of Saatli, some distance from where it meets the Kura, and by opening a new bed for itself, a large area, almost the Mughan desert, was submerged in the waters of the Araz. As a result of the flooding of the Araz, a new Araz in the Mughan plain, a large tributary was separated from it and directed to the Caspian Sea through the Kyzylagac Bay. As a period of government officials, they did not take any measures regarding the overflowing Araz river in the spring months (Araz had flooded once in 1868). Local people tried to build dams in a very primitive way to protect their houses and yards. However, all this did not give any results and the Araz River was flooded with 100,000 decimeters of land.

The creation of the new Araz in 1896 was a historical event in the way of Mughan becoming an arable land and cultivation. Thus, after the water receded from the flooded areas, the local Azerbaijani population took advantage of this situation and obtained abundant crops. This fact woke up the Russian officials. In essence, a new epoch has begun in the economic appropriation of Mughan. Parallel to the new branch of Araz, various large water canals were built from Araz itself to the Mughan steppe and were directed to the Caspian Sea. The construction of irrigation canals from the Araz River made the surrounding

uncultivated land suitable for farming. This plan was implemented by the water inspectorate in the Caucasus under the leadership of an engineer named Petrov. As a result of the flooding of the Kura and Araz rivers, it helped to fertilize the surrounding lands. The activity of G.S. Golitsy, the governor of Transcaucasia, and the activity of Saposhnikov, who is responsible for the management of the state property of the Baku governorate, should be especially noted in the revival of resettlement in Mughan and the expansion of settlement works.

In 1900, for the first time, a loan of 37,000 rubles was allocated for the construction of an irrigation canal by the instructions of Prince Golitsy. "In 1901, the water transport engineer Mayevsky built a small canal in the old Sarajalar canal, which has its source in Yeni Araz, allowing to irrigate 1000 desyats of land" (Baghirov, 2009, p. 29).

It should be emphasized that the construction of kilometers of water channels, which began in the 1900s and continued in the 1920s, was based on manual labor. During the period of Tsarist Russia, the settlers themselves built the irrigation canals for the resettled Russian peasants. In return, they were given large plots of land and many concessions were made. It should be noted that the new canal (1901), which was separated from the old Sarajalar canal as a branch, boosted the prosperity of Yeni Nikolayevka village. This village Novo-Nikolayevka was called the Red village (Krasnoselsky) during the Soviet era and now it has been returned to its previous historical name - Kara Nuru. In the following years, many irrigation canals were built, called Golitsyn's canal network (so-called system).

## 2. Russian settlers of Mughan in the early XX century and Stolypinism

N.N. Shavrov notes that "the rapid increase in the population of the European part of Russia creates the need to relocate a part of it to empty, uninhabited areas. Shirvan, Mil and Mughan plains were among such areas. 250,000 or 300,000 Russian families could be settled in the waste lands of these three plains, and as a result a governorate consisting of an entirely Russian population could be formed." (Shavrov, 1909).

N. Shavrov also expresses his attitude to the resettlement of non-Russian peoples in Transcaucasia by Tsarist Russia. In the very introductory part of the book, he writes that "after the Armenian-Georgian uprising that suddenly broke out in the Caucasus in 1905-1906, it became clear that one of the main options to prevent Transcaucasia from breaking away from us (Russia) in the future is to increase the number of population of Russian origin in this land, so that even their minimum number in this land should not be less than half of the local population of this place." (Baghirov, 2009, p. 7) According to the data of 1911, the author presents historical facts that 1 million of the 1,300,000 Armenians living in Transcaucasia were resettled by the Russian Empire (from 1828 to 1911) and were immigrants. He does not hide his objection to the increase of the non-Russian element (population). Most likely, the brazenness of Armenians against Russia in 1905-1906 forced the author to come to this conclusion.

The Armenians, whom Tsarist Russia transferred and settled in the lands of Azerbaijan, also plundered the empire itself. In traditional historiography, we usually come across the presentation of the event that happened in 1905-1906 as an Armenian-Muslim massacre. However, we can learn the correct approach to these events, that Armenians have been preparing for national autonomy for a long time, and that Muslim Azerbaijanis have become innocent victims, is described in M.S. Ordubadi's work entitled "Years of Blood" (the history of the Armenian-Muslim feud that took place in the Caucasus in 1905-1906): At the meeting in the "Aghoghlan" monastery, the authorized representatives of the Dashnaksutyun party took advantage of Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905 and thought about political autonomy: "We, the Armenian nation, have longed to demand our national rights and administrative independence. Finally, our enemy, the Russian Empire, is in the position of a big bulky elephant. We and

you, or rather other peoples who are not Russians, were always helpless, we were cornered by the fear of the tyrannical government, that stubborn bulky elephant, and we were whimpering. But thanks be to God Almighty that Japanese flies, which are weaker than us, have hit this cruel elephant so hard that our dream came true. That fly chased the cruel elephant so much that it finally fell on its back into a deep ditch and canal. Now, brothers, let's join hands and destroy by smashing the flesh of that elephant." (Ordubadi, 1993). For almost 20 years, the Armenians, under the leadership of the Armenian church, Dashnak and other political parties, were supplying arms and ammunition and trying to use the Azerbaijanis (taking into account their ignorance and unawareness of the essence of the event) as a means to realize their goals.

N.N. Shavrov also touches on the political significance of the settlement of Russians in Mughan: "The Mughan region covers the area from the Caspian Sea along the Iranian border to Araz. It belongs to the vast Mughan steppe, which is supposed to be settled with Russians. At least one million people of Russian origin can be successfully accommodated in Mughan, and thus the central part of Eastern Transcaucasia will be populated with a population of Russian origin. The northern part of this region, which is occupied by Russia, is inhabited by Lezgis and Georgians (Caucasian-speaking peoples - S.I.) in the territories up to Dagestan and Kakheti. In the west, this land is bordered by Georgians (moved Armenians and Tatars (Azerbaijani Turks), and in the south directly by Iran (South Azerbaijan - S.I.) (Shavrov, 1909). At the moment, this province is completely empty, and this is our (Russia - S.I.) situation here. On the whole, our southern borders are suffering from the constant attacks of the Shahsevans, and our Turkish neighbors, on the advice of their far-sighted German politicians and soldiers, are now trying to capture Urmia and get behind our positions in Asia Minor". N. Shavrov notes that in the future, in order to prevent the Ottoman state from entering Transcaucasia from the direction of Urmia and to prevent the occupation of the territories up to Dagestan, to organize a serious resistance against the Turks, it is a vital necessity to organize a Russian governorate with a population of at least one million in Eastern Transcaucasia, that is, Mughan. The Russian-speaking population transferred to the Russian army can be of great help. The one-million-strong Russo-Slavic element located in Mughan has a special significance in terms of spreading Christianity to the local population and Russian cultural influence on the local population. If a period of peaceful conditions for natural growth is created for the one million population to be relocated for at least ten years, the number of Russians will increase rapidly, the position of the private property class in Transcaucasia will be significantly strengthened, and as a result, the Russian element will gain a superior position." According to his notes, the Russian population consisting of peasants (numbering one million) was settled in Mughan and placed between Dagestan, Iran, Turkey, and Georgians, and it is also important in terms of dividing them and preventing them from uniting. The resettlement of the population should be intensive and if its proper placement is well organized, then this measure would add strength to Russia's power. In this way, in order to prevent "unfortunate" events expected as a result of the increase in the number of the local population, the relocation of the Russian-speaking population was considered as the basis. It should be noted that the settlement of Mughan with Russians had a political, economic and military strategic purpose. In 1888, 13 years after the Russian settlement of Petropavlovka (now the city of Sabirabad) was established, the Russian resettlement in Mughan turned into an intensive, systematic migration process. At the beginning of the 20th century, the center point of the Russian Empire's resettlement policy in the Caucasus became Mughan. It was necessary to build water channels and create an irrigation-watering system for the economic exploitation of the Mughan desert. In 1905-1914, the transfer of Russian peasants to this area as a labor force for the creation of industrial cotton cultivation and pig farming, a new area of cattle breeding in Mughan, was carried out rapidly at the state level. At the beginning of the 20th century, Russian settlements and villages supported in Mughan were part of N. Stolip's economic policy.

At the beginning of the 20th century, the main place of resettlement of Russian peasants in Mughan (northern part of Mughan S.I.) was Javad district.

The main thing is that from 1902 to 1916, more than 50 Russian villages were built one after the

other in Mughan, and more than 20 thousand Russian villagers were resettled. However, there were not a few people who immigrated on their own. Based on the documents of State Historical Archive of the Republic of Azerbaijan (fund-43, list-2, storage unit-73,69) table below that we have presented, where and in what year the population of some Russian villages were relocated is systematized in the following table (Azerbaijan Republic State Historical Archive [ARDTA], fund 43, inventory 2, file 69, 73). Thus, the majority of those transferred to Mughan are from other lands in Ukraine, including Kiev they were the peasants of the governorates! This is clearly visible in the table which compiled by us!

| | Names of villages built in Javad district | Previous residence | Year | Number of families |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. | Nikonovka The former residence of the villagers who moved to Nikonovka village of Javad district on their own | Kyiv Governorate, Kharkov Governorate | 1910 | 101 families |
| 2. | New Kherson | Stavropol Governorate | 1910 | 150 families |
| 3. | New Troitski | From different governorates | 1906 1910 | 33 families |

| | | | | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | (Kuban region, from Saratov, Orlov, Voronezh, Simbirski, Chernikov, Voronezh governorates), from Penza, Poltava, Ryazan, Chernyov, Kherson, Donskoy, Tauria, Yekaterinoslav governorates | | |
| 4. | Osipovski | From different governorates | 1911 | 25 families |
| 5. | Poltava | From different governorates | 1913 | 40 families |
| 6. | Petrovo-Polya | From Tula, Kursk, Poltava, Nodar, Voronezh, Kherson, Kyiv, Penza | 1912, july | 17 families |

| | | Governorates, from the city of Ekaterinodar and Kharkiv | | |
|----|----|----|----|----|
| 7. | Rumyantsevsky | | 1913 | 32 families |
| 8. | Preobrazhensky | | 1913 | 24 families |
| 9. | Skobelevsky | Lankaran city of Baku Governorate | 1917 | 22 families |
| 10. | Romanovsky | Kherson and Podolsky, Voronezh, Mşanin, Poltav, Çerniqov, Kharkiv, Donski, Orlov, Kuban, Vyatka | 1916 | 83 families |
| 11. | Pakrovka | August in 1909 Podolsk, Kuban, Anaga, Mshinsky, Voronezh, Kyiv, | 1905 compilation, In 1909 new arrival | 64 families + 116 families =180 Families |

| | | Kursk, Tavriçeskiy | to Pakrovka | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 12. | Semyonovsky | From different governorates | 1912 | 31 families |
| 13. | Seversky | From different governorates | 1912 | 37 families |
| 14. | Stolipinka | From different governorates | 1912 | 39 families |
| 15. | Slepchovsky | Voronej, Kharkiv, Kuban, Kursk, Penza, Tavriya | 1910 | 87 families |
| 16. | Suvorovka | From different governorates | 1917 | 48 families |
| 17. | Smolensky | Kharkiv Governorate | 1914 | 19 families |
| 18. | Petropavlovsky | Penza, Voronezh, Kazan governorates Yekaterinoslav, Samara governorates, Don region and the city of Cheboksary | 1892-August family list | 90 families |

N.N. Shavrov writes: "As a result of the planned and proper implementation of the settlement of Russians in Mughan and other steppes of Eastern Transcaucasia, within 5-10 years we can create a Russian governorate with a population of 1.5 million people here" (Shavrov, 1911) .

In the spring of 1909, Count I.I. Voronsov-Dashkov, the Viceroy of the Caucasus, who visited

Northern Mughan, informed the Tsar of Russia about the results of his visit to Mughan: "I think that the cultivation of land based on the artificial irrigation system will achieve great success and will be a great impetus to the development and flowering of Mughan. . On October 25, 1908, A. Krivoshein, the head of the Caucasus Department of Agriculture and Land Management, appealed to the State Duma with a letter to release financial resources for the cultivation of the Mughan desert" (Baghirov, 2009, p. 298). During that period, the development dynamics of planting and cultivation of Mughan lands were as follows:

In 1902-1908 - 6000 desyatins

In 1908-1909 - 16,000 desyatins

In 1910 - 18,000 desyatins

In 1912 - 47,000 desyatins

In 1913 - 50,000 desyatins

N.N. Shavrov notes that the rapid increase in the population of the European part of Russia creates the need to relocate a part of it to empty, uninhabited areas. Shirvan, Mil and Mughan plains were among such areas. In the waste lands of these three plains 250,000 or 300,000 Russian families could be settled, and the result would be a governorate composed of an entirely Russian population. At the beginning of the 20th century, in 1905-1914, the resettlement of peasants to Mughan was carried out at the state level, and the Russian settlements and villages founded here were part of N. Stolyp's reforms. P. B. Struve took the epigraph of P. A. Stolypin's famous motto "Great Russia" "forward with great changes" to his article "Great Russia" published in 1908 in the newspaper "Russian Idea" and noted that the abolition of Obshchinas and peasants with free private property along with the creation of the railway line, the expansion of the railway network throughout the country will stimulate economic development and is of historical significance (Oldenburg, 2013, p. 38). Most of the peasants who were transferred to Mughan were from the governorates where agrarian reforms were taking place, Tavria, Yekaterinoslav, Kherson, Kharkiv, Poltava, Pskov, Smolensk and other regions (Oldenburg, 2013, p. 39). If in the 30s-60s of the 19th century, those who were transferred to Mughan were heretics or sectarists Russian peasants (Russian sectarians): Molokans, Dukhobors, Priguns, Subbotniks and other Russians were exiles. In 1830-1880, Russian migrations were weak and unsystematic character oriented in terms of spontaneous and organizational aspects. At the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, the nature of the resettlement of Russians was different. In fact, it was Petropavlovka (I.S. on the site of Sabirabad), which was founded in 1888 and was the first Russian settlement created in Mughan and its population consisted of only Russian-pro-Slavic peasants. As we mentioned earlier, at the beginning of the 20th century, the main place of resettlement of Russian peasants was Javad district. In the years 1902-1916, 55 Russian towns, 21 oba (villages made up of Russian-pro-Slav peasants), 3620 house (yards) were built here, and a total of 21094 people were resettled here. According to the information given by A. Brilinski in 1915, 53 Russian settlements were built in Mughan, and according to the agricultural census of 1917, 54 towns were established. Russian families who were transferred to Mughan and settled on treasure lands were provided with enough land. The correspondent of the newspaper "Moscow (Innovations) News" noted that the population relocated to Mughan was given a large area of land as a gift. In addition, the new arrivals were given ready-made houses worth 150-200 rubles, they were given financial assistance and even (to protect themselves from the locals) they were given a rifle with a cartridge. Thus, the resettlement of Russian peasants to Mughan at the beginning of the 20th century can be seen as one of P.A. Stolypin's measures to save Russia from the economic and political crisis. One branch of the reforms, which covered the entire economic sphere of the Russian Empire under the leadership of P.A. Stolypin, was the problem of massive relocation of peasants with little land from the central governorates to more remote areas. Since 1906, the resettlement of peasants with little land from the central provinces

of the Russian Empire to Central Asia, Siberia and the Caucasus has become one of the main directions of state policy. The revolution of 1905-1907 greatly increased the state's attention to the peasant issue, and the solution of this problem was entrusted to P.A. Stolypin, who was the governor of the Saratov province until 1903, and who was appointed the minister of internal affairs of the Russian Empire from 1903. The main essence of these reforms was that everyone was given the right to leave the community and they were given 15 desyatin (15 ha) of land. P.A.Stolypi's revolutions destroyed centuries-old historical traditions by destroying peasant communities, stratification among peasants divided them from the inside. A wealthy peasant who left the community and became a private owner became the support of the state. Stolypin was entrusted with the order of Nicholas II to make the peasants leave the community and become small, private owners, and constantly increase the number of owner peasants. The relocation process was not easy at all. Peasants who were moved from the central provinces of the empire to remote areas due to lack of land faced various difficulties. This problem was similar in Siberia, Central Asia, Far East and Mughan. According to A.Shubin, 500,000 of the 3 million peasants who were transferred from the central governorates to Asia and Siberia returned because they could not adapt to the local geographical conditions. There was a lot of land in Siberia, but little usable land. In other regions inhabited by Turkic peoples, for example, in Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Central Asia, various conflicts arose with Muslim-Turkish peoples. According to the Russian historian K. Mogilevsky, P. A. Stolipin's reforms faced serious difficulties. In the process of resettlement, the interests of the local population (there were many such incidents in Mughan) were trampled upon. You could also see that a Russian village was being built in the morning on the road of the village inhabited by the local population. If we take into account that they are provided with weapons and keep pigs, then we can see how the national and moral values of the Muslim-Turks are affected. The most fertile lands where the local population kept cattle were sometimes cut and taken away for the benefit of the newcomers. The uprisings in Kazakhstan and Central Asia in 1916 were the result of hatred of immigrants. This reform was of interest to the Russian Empire and Russians. As a result of P.A. Stolipin's reforms, significant progress was made in the financial field. If the state income of Russia in 1897 was 1 billion 400 million rubles. In 1912, this number was 3 billion 104 million rubles. According to S.S. Oldenburg, the amount of tax per person in Russia was 2 times less than in Germany and France. According to the amount of tax per person, it was 4 times less than England, and 2 times less than Germany and France. During the reform period (1906-1916), the use of agricultural machinery increased by 3 times (Oldenburg, 2013).

F. Bagirov summarizing the statistical data on the total number of villages where the settlers were located and related to January 1, 1914, writes: Thus, in total, 185 of the 342 Russian settlements in Transcaucasia were established in Azerbaijan, of which 140 were located in the territories of the Baku governorate. 107 of them fell to Lankaran and Javad districts (p. 390). 80 villages where displaced persons settled were built in Javad district. In the earlier stages of resettlement, Lankaran, Shamakhi districts and Yelizavetpol (Ganja) were mostly settled, while at the beginning of the 20th century, the focus was on Northern Mughan as part of Stolypinism and the promotion of industrial cotton cultivation. The basis of cotton cultivation in Northern Mughan started in 1900 in Novo-Nikolayevka (now Kara Nuru) in an experimental area with an area of 2 desyatins, and soon it became widespread in Mughan. In 1906, 2,000 desyatins, and in 1912, 10,000 desyatins were the basis of industrial cotton cultivation (Baghirov, 2009, p. 355). V. Masalskov's article "Cotton cultivation in the Transcaucasia" presents statistical figures on the development dynamics of cotton production in the Baku governorate as follows: 73,500 pounds in 1909, 182,000 pounds in 1910, 309,000 pounds in 1911, 289,500 pounds in 1912 and 416,900 pounds of cotton were produced in 1913. Although the pioneers of cotton growing were the displaced Russian peasants, and they brought this field of agriculture to Mughan at the beginning of the 20th century, the labor force was made up of local peasants. It produced 289,500 pounds of cotton a year, and 416,900 pounds of cotton in 1913 (Baghirov, 2009, p. 357). Although the pioneers of cotton cultivation were the displaced Russian peasants, who brought this field of agriculture to Mughan at the beginning of the 20th century, the labor force was made up of local peasants. Thus, at the beginning of the 20th century, the main part of the Russians who were transferred to

North Azerbaijan were settled in Baku governorate. This was 9.0% of the population of the governorate (72,178 people). Accordingly, this figure was 3.1% (36,697 people) in Yelizovetpol governorate (Baghirov, 2009, p. 362). Thus, the creation of Russian settlements was carried out in parallel with the suppression and deportation of the local population. Let's look at the historical facts: in 1877, after the conflict in Mikhaylovka, where the local population settled with the local population, the population of Kusnet and Haji Huseyin winter camp was moved to other areas, Vladimirovka and Elenovka villages were built in place of those villages (Baghirov, 2009, p. 459). At the beginning of the 20th century, the same disaster happened to Bolgarkand, Kharmandali, Adna Gulukand, Balacakand and other villages on the outskirts of Bolgarchay of Javad district in Mughan, as well as to Alar village community of Lankaran district. Alar residents were moved to other areas (Baghirov, 2009, p. 464-465). Similar incidents and conflicts were happening continuously and covered the entire Mughan geography. It should be noted that the above-mentioned difficulties of the villagers transferred to Mughan were soon resolved. It has already been mentioned above, and they became the ethnic support of Russia here. Villagers were given weapons for "self-defense", churches were built for them, schools were built near the church, medical personnel were created, and irrigation canals were provided. Tens of years would pass, these hundreds of thousands of displaced Russian peasants would become the ethnic support of Tsarist Russia in Mughan and become a real obstacle to the restoration of our statehood. The population of Russian villages who called themselves "Mughans" became a military-political tool in the hands of various political forces: Aghvardiya, Bolshevik-Menshevik-Dashnak, Eser and others during the turbulent period of 1917-1918. At that time, one of the main issues facing the national forces was the neutralization of numerous armed groups in the Russian villages of Mughan, the confiscation of their weapons, and the restoration of law and order in these villages. The inhabitants of those villages also had enough weapons. Disruptive detachments of the Russian army were stationed in those villages, and the leadership of the Baku Soviet regularly sent weapons and manpower. In particular, well-armed organized military forces have been deployed in the villages of Privolni, Prishib, and Nikolayevka. Although there was a difference of opinion between them on the issue of power in Russia, their positions on the attitude towards Azerbaijan completely coincided (Aliyeva, 2011, p. 38). On the eve of the establishment of the Republic of Azerbaijan, the partisan units of the Russian villages of Muga joined forces led by Russian nationalist officers. Colonel Ilyashevich led these forces, which had close ties to Denikin's troops in Russia. He was the commander of the 29th Russian border brigade stationed south of Mugan to protect the border line with Iran. Colonel Ilyashevich, a typical representative of Russian nationalist officers, does not want to accept the independence of Azerbaijan and considered it a part of indivisible Russia. Therefore, he took active measures to bring the region under his control by using force in the existing situation, and by strengthening himself here, turned the station into a base for the future attack of Denikinists on Azerbaijan (Suleymanov, 2014, p. 438). In August 1919, the military forces of the Republic of Azerbaijan under the leadership of General Habib Bey Salimov fully established their power in the Lankaran region, anti-national forces were disarmed.

## CONCLUSION

This article has examined Tsarist Russia's resettlement policy in the Mughan region as a component of imperial colonial governance, arguing that the relocation of a Russian-speaking population to Northern Azerbaijan was not a purely demographic phenomenon but a purposeful

mechanism linking territorial control, frontier security, and economic exploitation. The evidence indicates that Mughan functioned as a strategic "frontier laboratory" where demographic engineering, administrative privilege, and infrastructural investment were deployed to consolidate imperial authority.

The study has identified three distinguishable phases of settlement. The first phase (1830–1860) was shaped primarily by the forced transfer of sectarian communities, reflecting a punitive and disciplinary logic of empire. The second phase (1888–1902) marked the emergence of a new colonization model associated with Petropavlovka and the gradual expansion of irrigation initiatives, through which resettlement became connected to planned agricultural development. The third phase (1902–1913/1916) coincided with the broader framework of Stolypin's agrarian reforms and demonstrates a transition toward a more systematic, state-supported settlement policy, characterized by the foundation of numerous new villages, the allocation of substantial land plots, and material and administrative incentives.

A central finding is that irrigation infrastructure and land redistribution were not neutral modernization measures but key instruments that enabled and accelerated colonization. The creation of canal networks and the expansion of cultivable land strengthened the economic viability of new settlements and supported the growth of commercial agriculture—especially cotton cultivation—while also reshaping local patterns of land use. At the same time, the preferential provisioning of resources and legal-administrative advantages to settlers contributed to asymmetries in local relations, generating frictions with indigenous communities and, in certain cases, facilitating displacement and the marginalization of local populations.

Finally, the article suggests that the longer-term political consequences of these settlements became visible during the crisis years of 1917–1919, when several colonist villages emerged as significant actors within local security dynamics and regional power struggles. While the present study does not reduce complex revolutionary events to a single causal factor, it shows that the institutional consolidation and militarized capacity of certain settlements—shaped in part by earlier state support—affected the balance of forces during this period.

The conclusions of this study are based on archival materials and contemporary publications, yet further research could deepen the analysis by systematically comparing Mughan with other colonization zones in the Caucasus and by integrating micro-level local case studies (land registers, community petitions, and district-level administrative correspondence). Such work would help clarify variation across districts, the socio-economic consequences for different segments of the local population, and the broader imperial logic linking settlement, infrastructure, and security in late Tsarist colonial policy.

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# FROM ERASURE TO RESIGNIFICATION: MEMORIALISING FRANCOIST WOMEN'S PRISONS

**Sarah Leggott**[*]

## ABSTRACT

This article explores the memorialisation of former Francoist women's prisons within Spain's contested memory landscape, in which competing interpretations of the history and memory of the Spanish Civil War and ensuing Franco dictatorship continue to cause controversy. Drawing on scholarship on "difficult" and gendered heritage, this discussion situates women's imprisonment within the regime's gender ideology and pseudo-scientific discourses that positioned Republican women as a significant threat to the nation. It then examines examples of sites of women's imprisonment during the dictatorship in three different cities - Madrid, Valencia, and Segovia - highlighting contrasting strategies of memorialisation at each site, with the initiatives discussed highlighting the impact of grassroots activism and civic engagement in shaping commemorative practices. These sites and discussions regarding their memorialisation also serve as a reminder of the gender-based repression and violence suffered by Republican women during the dictatorship.

**Keywords:** Francoist repression; women's prisons; gendered violence; historical memory; Spain; heritage studies; testimonial literature; memorialisation; dictatorship; feminist heritage.

## INTRODUCTION

This article explores debates in contemporary Spain about the remaining physical heritage of the repressive Franco dictatorship that was in place from 1939 to 1975. In particular, it examines the different ways in which sites of gendered repression from that period are memorialised in a context of fierce debates about the legacy of Francoism. Through discussion of three case studies, the key aims of this research are to reveal the ways in which the regime's gender ideology led to a particular victimisation of Republican women and to explore the impact of different strategies of that seek to memorialise the gender violence perpetrated under Francoism. It also seeks to fill a gap in existing scholarship around the gendered nature of heritage practice in Spain and the significant impact that grassroots activism and civic engagement can have in the shaping of commemorative practices.

## CONTEXT

As competing interpretations of the history and memory of the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and ensuing Franco dictatorship (1939-1975) continue to be the subject of debate in 21st-century Spain, so too does the question of how to deal with the remaining material heritage of the regime. While recent decades have seen streets renamed, statues removed, and public figures exhumed, calls for the public recognition and marking of further sites associated with the regime persist, together with calls for the development of new memorials to honour the victims of Francoism. The fact that these proposals continue to generate social and political controversy in contemporary Spain signals the continued lack of consensus over how to memorialise a contested past.

These debates are not unique to Spain, with many communities around the world grappling with how to remember or forget, preserve or destroy, the legacy of painful periods in their history. Scholars have used terms such as "dissonant," "undesirable," or "difficult" heritage to refer to histories that evoke conflicting memories for different groups, and over which there is a lack of agreement regarding their

representation and interpretation (Tunbridge & Ashworth, 1996; Macdonald, 2006, 2009).

Within this broader context, I am particularly interested in how sites of gendered repression under the Franco regime have been marked and memorialised as a means of giving visibility to women's experiences under the dictatorship.

My discussion here focuses on the memorialisation of former prison sites where violent gendered repression took place under the Franco dictatorship, examining the extent to which these are publicly recognised and historically preserved places in 21st-century Spain. This paper will first discuss the gender ideology espoused by the Franco regime and the ways in which this informed the treatment of Republican women, before examining the very different ways in which three significant sites of women's imprisonment, in Madrid, Valencia, and Segovia, have been commemorated.

**METHODOLOGY**

In addition to being framed by the work on "difficult" or "dissonant" heritage referenced above, this research also draws on scholarship from the fields of heritage studies and gender studies. In particular, it explores the ways in which the pseudo-scientific gender discourse deployed by the Franco regime informed the treatment of Republican women. The discussion is also framed by analyses of women's experiences of imprisonment under the regime and by scholarly work on different approaches to memorials to contested material culture. This research adopts a comparative approach, examining case studies of sites of imprisonment in three Spanish cities, contrasting the different approaches adopted to seek to memorialise the gender-based repression perpetrated at these sites.

**1.       GENDER IDEOLOGY UNDER FRANCOISM**

In the late 20th century, historians of Spain noted the scarcity of documentation concerning women's experiences during the civil war and dictatorship, with Mary Nash having described historical amnesia on women as "acute," even within the broader public silencing of that history that characterised the first decades of democracy (1991, p.382).[2] The lack of historical studies and reliable official documentation led scholars to turn initially to the testimonial accounts of survivors and witnesses, works that provide important insights into women's experiences of repression and imprisonment, as well as inscribing stories of resistance and agency. Highly significant in this field are the testimonies compiled by Tomasa Cuevas, herself a Communist activist who was arrested, imprisoned and tortured during the Franco years. Following her release, Cuevas travelled to different parts of Spain to gather the testimonies of fellow inmates, accounts that were originally published in three volumes, later reedited as a single volume (2004). Other testimonial accounts recounting women prisoners' memories and experience are those of Sara Berenguer (1988), Juana Doña (1978), Soledad Real (1983), and Remedios Montero (2004), among others.

In more recent years, a growing body of scholarship has sought to foreground the gendered nature of Francoist repression, particularly the sexual violence perpetrated against Republican women, who were punished not only for their political affiliations, but also for transgressing the gender roles imposed by the regime. Under the dictatorship's conservative ideology, known as National Catholicism, women's primary responsibility was to be wives and mothers, with the leader of the women's section of the Falange,[3] Pilar Primo de Rivera, declaring that "the only mission assigned to women in the work of the Fatherland is the home" (as cited in Morcillo 2000, p.45).[4] This restrictive gender ideology was institutionalised by the regime

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[2] The silencing of aspects of Spain's recent past during the country's transition to democracy has been widely analysed by historians. See, for example, Aguilar Fernández (2001); Colomer (1998); Morán (1991).

[3] The Falange was the Spanish Nationalist movement that became the sole legal political party during the dictatorship.

[4] All translations from material originally in Spanish are my own.

through legal and social mechanisms which curtailed women's rights to work, travel, and own property without male permission.

Within this traditionalist framework, women associated with the Republic were considered to constitute a threat to Spanish society; as Tabea Linhard notes, "in the rhetoric of Nationalist and later Francoist Spain, politically active women became the culprits of the disasters and the unrestrained violence of the civil war" (2005, p.27). This was based on the regime's view that holding left-wing beliefs, all of which were designated as "Marxist," was symptomatic of psychological illness. This theory was derived from a pseudo-scientific discourse developed by the regime's Director of Psychological Research, Antonio Vallejo Nágera who, drawing on eugenic theories, argued that such beliefs posed an extreme threat to the purity of what he referred to as the "Hispanic race," warning of the dangers of "a social mass contaminated by democratic and Marxist viruses" (1937, p.6). This belief was invoked by the regime to position supporters of the Republic as "pathological, criminalized, and inferior subjects" (Campos, 2014, p.34). Within this discourse, women were considered to pose a particular threat to the future of the nation due to their maternal capacity which, Vallejo Nágera posited, made possible the transmission of their leftist beliefs to the next generation. Furthermore, women were considered to be particularly predisposed to left-wing influences due to their supposed "lack of mental stability, minimal resistance to environmental influences, poor control over their personality, and impulsiveness" (Vallejo Nágera & Martínez, 1939, p.398). This made women a particular target for silencing and erasure, with Vallejo Nágera's call for the imposition of "a very strict social discipline" (1938, p.12) as a "cure" evoked to justify the violence perpetrated against Republican women.

## 2.   GENDERED VIOLENCE UNDER THE FRANCO DICTATORSHIP

Scholars deploy terms such as "sexualised violence" and "gendered violence" to refer to the crimes committed against women by the regime, ranging from beatings and torture to rape and symbolic assaults on the female body. In her study of Nazi violence against Jewish women, Brigitte Halbmayer includes both direct physical assaults, such as rape and forced nudity, and indirect emotional violations, including imposed nakedness, humiliating medical examinations, and suggestive insults (2010, p.30). In the case of Francoist Spain, such violence against women and girls has until quite recently received limited critical attention, with Maud Joly arguing that "the issue of sexualized violence in the war - analysed as such - rarely constitutes an object of history in itself" (2008, p.93). Joly's work, together with that of scholars such as Irene Abad (2009), Gina Herrmann (2013), and Paul Preston (2012), have opened up this field, with Preston confirming that "[m]urder, torture and rape were generalized punishments for the gender liberation embraced by many, but not all, liberal and left-wing women during the Republican period" (2012, p.xix). Republican women who survived imprisonment often experienced enduring physical and psychological trauma. Many were subjected to sexual violence, head shaving, and public humiliation, including due to the administration of castor oil, which caused uncontrollable defecation and was considered a symbolic act of purification. The perpetration of gender specific violence is also confirmed by recent forensic and archaeological work at mass grave sites, with analysis by forensic archaeologist Laura Muñoz-Encinar (2019) unearthing material evidence of this, including the execution of pregnant women.

Much of this violence took place in the many sites of imprisonment that formed part of the regime's vast penitentiary system in which thousands of political prisoners were detained across the country in prisons, detention centres, and improvised holding facilities, which included spaces such as churches and convents. Conditions within these institutions were dire, with Preston's work, as well as studies by Fernando Hernández Holgado (2003) and Ricard Vinyes (2002), documenting the extreme overcrowding and prevalence of disease, malnutrition, and lack of basic hygiene, which contributed to high mortality rates among inmates. Preston notes that "torture and maltreatment provoked many suicides, some of them faked to conceal beatings that had gone too far" (2012, p.477). Women imprisoned under Francoism faced particularly harsh conditions, described by Ángeles Egido León as a "differentiated repression" given that

women's imprisonment was designed to serve the dual function of punishment and ideological correction: "women's prisons were conceived as spaces of moral regeneration and social re-education" (2017, p.24). Female prisoners were thus subjected not only to physical deprivation but also to moral re-education, often led by religious orders that controlled many women's prisons, particularly in the early years of the dictatorship.

## 3.  HERITAGE AND GENDER

While recent scholarship has therefore cast light on women's experiences of imprisonment during the dictatorship, little attention has been paid to the sites of incarceration in recent discussions about the material legacy of Francoism, indicative of a broader marginalisation of women's histories and experiences in the public memory landscape. Scholars have signalled the paucity of monuments commemorating women, noting that, if women are represented at all, they tend to be cast in allegorical or passive roles as, for example, grieving mothers or symbolic embodiments of the nation (Abousnnouga & Machin, 2013; Warner. 2000). This is mirrored in the traditional lack of memorialisation of physical sites associated with women's history, indicative of the gendered dynamics of heritage practices noted by Laurajane Smith: "Heritage is gendered. It is gendered in the way that heritage is defined, understood and talked about and, in turn, in the way it reproduces and legitimizes gender identities and the social values that underpin them. A range of assumptions about the experiences of men and women are embedded in the definitions and discourses of heritage" (2008, p.161). In more recent years, scholars and activists have advocated for gendered perspectives to be considered in heritage practices, with Anna Reading, for example, calling for the boundaries of heritage to expand to include "difficult" and gendered histories, including those of sexual violence (2015). This has led to the development of feminist heritage initiatives, both physical and virtual, that seek to reinsert women into national narratives and foreground their experiences of repression and resistance.

These dynamics are evident in the memorialisation of sites associated with the gendered repression of the Franco dictatorship. Many of these spaces were erased from the physical landscape in the later years of the dictatorship, with some buildings demolished and the land sold for development and others reassigned for other purposes. This has been read as a deliberate strategy adopted by the regime, with Cinta Ramblado-Minero noting that the sites' "original history and purpose were covered up, hidden in overlapping layers of meaning that suppressed a violent past. With the end of the dictatorship, no trace was left of the systematic repression that the Francoist state had exerted upon political (and social) dissidents" (2016, p.161). This is where, she argues, the testimonial accounts referred to above play a key role in re-creating for readers in narrative form the spaces that have been destroyed. Likewise, contemporary memorialisation of such spaces contests their erasure, even where the original sites of repression have been destroyed.

## 4.  VENTAS PRISON, MADRID

A significant example is Madrid's Ventas prison, where thousands of female prisoners were held in horrific conditions during the dictatorship. The prison was razed to make way for residential buildings in the early 1970s, a move criticised by some as erasing a painful but important chapter of Spain's history. Built in 1931 under the leadership of Republican Director General of Prisons Victoria Kent, Ventas was designed to be a model prison for women that would facilitate rehabilitation for up to 500 prisoners. However, under the Franco regime, Ventas became what has been described as a severely overcrowded "warehouse of women" (Cuevas, 2004, p.17) that would house thousands of prisoners. The excessive number of inmates, together with a lack of food, water and medical care, led to many instances of disease and death. Abuse, humiliation, physical punishment and sexual torture against inmates were also common practice in the prison, documented in both historical analyses and testimonial accounts. The last prisoners were transferred from Ventas to other penitentiary centres in 1969, with the prison buildings then demolished. At that time, no

memorial or marker of any kind was erected to acknowledge the site's history as a centre of imprisonment and repression, with scholars noting "its complete disappearance in a real estate project in which the preservation of even a single element of the building was never considered" (Hernández Holgado et al, 2022, p.642).

It would not be until some decades later that acts of memorialisation would take place, largely due to sustained advocacy on the part of relatives of former prisoners, local residents, historians, and memory activists who sought to preserve the legacy of the prison and its inmates. It also sprang from the grassroots protest movement in Madrid in May 2011, known as the 15M movement, that was sparked by widespread dissatisfaction with Spain's political and economic systems. One of the groups associated with this movement organised memorial events at the former prison site on International Women's Day in March 2012, also installing a commemorative plaque.[5] Their advocacy contributed to an initiative on the part of local authorities to develop a website as a virtual memorial to the prison and its inmates, launched in 2017. The website was later deactivated when right-leaning parties controlled the relevant local authorities, with grassroots groups later relaunching it. A number of other digital initiatives have also sought to narrate and preserve the history of Ventas; with the physical legacy of the site having been destroyed, these digital archives play an important role as a repository for preserving documents, photographs, oral histories, and individual and collective memories of the prison.[6] Further recognition of the site's history came in 2019, when a park at the former prison site was renamed the Garden of the Women of Ventas and a plaque installed; the plaque was later vandalised and removed.

In the case of Ventas, the erasure of the repressive prison space from the physical landscape has been counteracted by grassroots advocacy that has ensured the preservation of memories, whether by material or digital means.[7] Interestingly, recent archaeological work has revealed that vestiges of the basements of the former prison do remain underneath the residential buildings. The uses of these underground spaces during the decades of the prison's existence have recently been analysed by historians, who note that during the dictatorship, these were used as cells for political prisoners who had been condemned to death and for women imprisoned for prostitution (Hernández Holgado et al., 2022). The discovery of these remnants of Ventas have sparked further discussion about how these findings might be integrated into public memory and further contribute to the memorialisation of the site.

## 5.   PROVINCIAL WOMEN'S PRISON AND SANTA CLARA CONVENT, VALENCIA

The defacement of the plaque commemorating the women of Ventas mentioned above is not an isolated case, with many such commemorative efforts facing backlash. However, while statues, monuments and other commemorative material are often the target of those holding opposing views, material commemorating women associated with the Republic appear to be particularly targeted. This can be seen in examples in the city of Valencia which has put in place a "historical memory route," named "València en la memoria," that guides visitors to multiple buildings and public spaces in the city that were significant during the civil war and dictatorship, all of which are marked with informative boards in three languages (Valencian, Spanish and English) and feature historical photographs. Among these is the Santa Clara convent, which was used after the civil war as an overflow site for the Provincial Women's Prison. The site and buildings that housed the prison itself are now a school, an example of a site of repression that was repurposed, its history all but erased from the physical landscape, with the exception of a commemorative plaque on one of its exterior walls that reads: "Let us not forget the Republican women who were persecuted,

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[5] This initiative was led by the group "Asamblea 15M de la plaza de Dalí."

[6] For extensive discussion of the website and other digital initiatives, see Hernández Holgado (2018, 2020).

[7] A similar example of grassroots memorialisation is seen in the case of Madrid's Provincial Prison, known as Carabanchel. The prison was demolished in 2008, despite protests from local groups, who advocated for its preservation as a site of memory. Local community activism later saw the creation of a memorial garden at the site. For discussion of this initiative, see Hepworth (2015).

the women who fought against the dictatorship, and all the women imprisoned under discriminatory laws."[8]

The Santa Clara convent still stands on its original site, with its history marked by a commemorative board featuring historical information about its use as a prison for a period of almost three years from mid-1939. As in Ventas and other sites of imprisonment, conditions for prisoners in the convent were horrendous, confirmed by research undertaken by Ana Aguado and Vicenta Verdugo: "In the Santa Clara Convent Prison, overcrowding meant that cells were shared by eight or ten inmates, in deplorable and degrading conditions. The lack of food, water and minimal hygiene led to children becoming infected with scabies, and tuberculosis, meningitis and an epidemic of whooping cough" (2011, p.76). The appalling conditions in the prison-convent are alluded to on the commemorative board erected at the site, which also features a photo of some of the women held there after the war. The board was, however, targeted by vandals soon after being erected, with the photo particularly defaced to obscure the women's faces, an act denounced as an attempt to once again erase the presence of women from historical memory. While the council repaired the board, it has been repeatedly vandalised in the same way.

Despite the vandalism carried out on the information board at the convent, the historical memory route established in Valencia constitutes a comprehensive attempt to memorialise sites of difficult heritage in the city, including sites of women's imprisonment. However, this is far less ambitious than the project to memorialise and reframe the former prison in the city of Segovia, a unique and quite groundbreaking initiative in the Spanish context, which has seen this former site of imprisonment and repression transformed into an arts centre and democratic memorial.

## 6.   SEGOVIA PRISON

The former prison in Segovia has a long and multifaceted history. In operation from 1924 to 2000, its shifting purpose and population over those years reflect the broader political and social changes in 20th-century Spain, as does its current function as a democratic memorial. Designed by architect Joaquín Odriozola, the prison was constructed in a style that reflected the predominant penal philosophies of the early 20th century, based on British philosopher Jeremy Bentham's 1785 concept of the panopticon. This model used a circular structure with a central observation tower, allowing supervision of all prisoners from a central point, a model originally aimed at emphasising surveillance and control over corporal punishment. At the time of its opening, the prison served as a women's reformatory, later becoming a modern penal hospital for men during the progressive years of the Second Republic.

However, the prison's function and philosophy changed significantly with the outbreak of the civil war, with the prison becoming overcrowded with male political prisoners. The conditions discussed above with regard to Madrid and Valencia were replicated here, and the extreme malnutrition, poor hygiene, and lack of medical care led to the spread of infectious diseases, especially tuberculosis. In an attempt to counter this, the regime established dedicated anti-tuberculosis penitentiary sanatoriums in a number of centres, with the prison in Segovia redeployed for this purpose between 1941 and 1943, before becoming a sanatorium for women prisoners with tuberculosis until 1946. For the following decade, from 1946 to 1956, the site became the Central Women's Prison of Segovia, the period of its history of particular interest for this discussion.

The objective of the designation of the facility as a women's prison was to relieve some of the pressure on Madrid's overcrowded Ventas prison, with political prisoners in particular transferred to Segovia. The prison came to house many prominent political detainees, including Soledad Real, Juana Doña, and Tomasa Cuevas, women who, as mentioned earlier, produced important testimonial accounts that inscribe their stories of repression and resistance. As at the other sites discussed, life inside the prison was marked by overcrowding, poor sanitation, inadequate food, and limited medical care. In addition, Vega

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[8] The school is the Colegio Público 9 d'Octubre located in the Paseo de la Petxina.

Sombría and García Funes have pointed to the bitter winter climate in Segovia as an exacerbating factor: "In addition to the hunger caused by meagre rations and extremely poor-quality food, those in Segovia endured a serious aggravating factor: the harsh winter cold, which lasted far longer than it does today" (2011, p.291). However, they also highlight the solidarity and camaraderie that developed among the prisoners, who continued to organise themselves along political lines (Vega Sombría and García Funes, 2011, p.311).

Following the closure of the Central Women's Prison of Segovia in 1956, the building was repurposed as a women's reformatory, imprisoning so-called "fallen women" who had been detained for offenses related to prostitution. In the later years of the dictatorship, it again held male political prisoners, eventually closing in 2000 when a new penitentiary centre was opened in Segovia.

The first decade of the 21st-century saw the development of an ambitious project, led by community and arts organisations in collaboration with local authorities, to repurpose the historic prison building as the Segovia Creative Arts Centre. The centre, which opened in 2010, seeks to promote multidisciplinary cultural innovation, showcasing performances, exhibitions and events across the visual arts, theatre, music, and literature. While significant renovation work was undertaken prior to the opening of the cultural centre, the basic architectural structure of the former prison has been retained. The centre also displays educative materials outlining the building's history, with an explicit statement that the objective of the project was to transform what had been a space of repression and confinement into one of creativity and artistic freedom: "The restoration project preserves the structure and layout of the former prison, but gives the spaces a new meaning to convey the metaphor at the heart of this initiative: imagination, innovation, and creativity will make Segovia and its citizens freer" (Ayuntamiento de Segovia, n.d.).

## 7.   DEMOCRATIC MEMORIAL, SEGOVIA

This preservation and repurposing of the prison space as a centre for creativity and community engagement is in itself a remarkable project of commemoration and reframing. However, even more striking is the permanent exhibition "Democratic Memorial of Segovia: The Francoist Prison (1936-1977)" that is housed in several restored prison cells at the site. The establishment of this memorial was the result of sustained advocacy by the Segovia branch of the Forum for Memory, one of the principal memory activist organisations in Spain, which organised a series of exhibitions, publications and events to publicise the prison's history. They also erected a monument in a neighbouring park in memory of the women who had been imprisoned there, an initiative undertaken in collaboration with the Association of Former Political Prisoners. The proposal to establish a permanent memorial at the former prison site, initially proposed to the city council in 2009, was eventually approved in 2016, thanks to the support of the political party United Left. The memorial was opened in 2019 with four former prison cells restored, with a further five opened in 2024.

The memorial in the former prison building seeks to honour the victims of Francoist repression who were held there as a means of ensuring remembrance of their stories and of this period of Spanish history, while also serving as an educational resource about the site's history. The exhibition is meticulously documented, outlining details of the different phases of the prison's history, with two of the cells dedicated specifically to memorialising the stories and experiences of the women detained there as political prisoners. Displays in the cells feature numerous historical documents, such as individual prisoner records, sentences and appeals, as well as photographs and fragments of letters and testimonies. In addition, detailed information boards explain the different facets of life within the prison walls, including subjects such as medical care, nutrition, and religious and disciplinary practices. The names of each of the prisoners held there are also inscribed on the information boards as a means of inscribing their identities and ensuring their permanence in the historical record.

Both the Creative Arts Centre and the Democratic Memorial in the former Segovia prison are

examples of what James Young has designated "counter-monuments," "painfully self-conscious memorial spaces conceived to challenge the very premises of their being" (1993, p.27). Such counter-monuments do not seek to offer closure nor relieve discomfort about a difficult past; rather, they aim to provoke reflection and highlight that memory is a dynamic and contested process, reflecting Young's notion that memory should remain open to reinterpretation, especially in the context of traumatic histories like the Holocaust. In the case of the reframing of the prison in Segovia, the recontextualization of the site and its repurposing as a creative arts centre facilitates critical reflection and engagement with aspects of the city's difficult past. The democratic memorial also points to the power that grassroots activism can have in framing the memorial landscape.

The memorial in Segovia is both informative and moving and has the potential to make a powerful impact in the process of remembrance of the repression perpetrated under the dictatorship, as well as serving as a model for other sites. However, while the memorial seeks to reach a wide range of audiences through guided tours and the hosting of public history initiatives, challenges of accessibility and visibility remain. Public opening hours are limited, with the site only open to the public for particular events or for guided tours; these are held infrequently, usually only once a month, as they rely on the participation of volunteers associated with the Forum for Memory. As indicated above, the establishment of the memorial was made possible by support from leftist political parties who governed the city council in Segovia at that time; the council is currently led by the right-leaning Popular Party, which is generally unsupportive of historical memory initiatives, making further funding for the memorial unlikely in the short term. Unfortunately, the impact of these constraints mean that public awareness of the memorial is limited, as is the ability for its pedagogical potential to be fully realised.

## CONCLUSION

The memorialisation of the former prison in Segovia serves as a powerful example of the influence that sustained grassroots advocacy can have in championing attempts to preserve and mark sites of repression in a context of shifting political and social dynamics and continued debates about dealing with the legacy of Francoism. While the memorialisation of the sites of women's prisons in Madrid and Valencia has been less ambitious, the initiatives developed at each nevertheless play an important role in ensuring that the histories of these sites and the repressive practices undertaken within them are not erased from public history and memory.

This research has revealed the ways in which very diverse commemorative strategies have been deployed effectively by memory activists in Spain – whether in the form of more modest plaques and information boards or in larger scale initiatives such as digital archives and immersive memorial exhibitions – can be effective in inscribing into the historical memory the gender-based repression and violence suffered by Republican women under Francoism. More broadly, the initiatives discussed here play an important role in the continued efforts in contemporary Spain to deal with the "difficult" heritage of civil war and dictatorship, while also highlighting the ongoing complexities and challenges inherent in that process.

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# THE PROBLEM OF COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND NATIONAL IDENTITY IN MODERN SOCIETY
# UNDER GLOBALIZATION CONDITIONS

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**ABSTRACT**

This article discusses the role of culture in the modern world undergoing dynamic transformations, the problem of collective memory and national identity, as well as the crisis of values and their underlying causes. Geopolitical tensions worldwide lead to the use of culture and national identity for various purposes among countries and regions. Advocates of the Americanized version of globalization view culture as a unifying tool that connects the spiritual worlds of people belonging to different nations and religious beliefs.

The article also analyzes some socio-psychological aspects of Azerbaijan's national identity and collective memory. Using an experimental approach, it explores the following questions: "How are patterns of collective memory, national, and religious identity related to the process of globalization?", "What patterns of national and religious self-identification are characteristic for youth of different ethnic origins?", "What features of national identity and collective memory are typical for young people from different ethnic groups?", and "To what extent are these types of collective memory compatible or contradictory to each other?" These questions are investigated within the specific cultural-historical context of Azerbaijan, based on empirical data obtained from research on Azerbaijani youth's national identity and collective memory.

The study employs qualitative methods such as historical analysis, observation, abstraction, and comparative analysis.

**Keywords:** globalization, collective memory, national identity, civilization, mass culture.

**INTRODUCTION**

The rapid development of globalization in the modern world causes profound changes in economic, political, and cultural spheres. The sovereignty of nation-states is weakening, and borders are increasingly crossed by flows of economy and information. This process not only intensifies the interaction of various cultures but also leads to serious crises in key cultural components such as national identity and collective memory. Against the backdrop of diverse ideological and political interests, the role of culture is being re-examined, and a synthesis of national and universal values is sought to respond to the new challenges posed by globalization.

Most scholars studying globalization argue that the decline of nation-states has ushered in an era of free movement of transnational corporations, capital, labor, goods, and services. Gradually, privileges are being transferred from nation-states to supranational bodies like the European Union, the Council of Europe, and other intergovernmental organizations. Moreover, the crossing of state borders is often viewed as a logical consequence of economic development. Therefore, it is not surprising that the EU invests significant resources in multinational programs aimed at cultivating a new identity among its people — European citizens. However, experience shows that local nationalism remains strong, and the vast majority of Europeans do not wish to replace their national identity simply with a "trans-European" one.

One of the main factors preventing the rapid transformation of national identity into transnational identity is perhaps the national culture, national identity, and collective memory. The globalizing world and culture do not merely push collective memory into the historical background; rather, as E. Smith emphasizes, it is accompanied by a revival of ethnonational myths, memories, and traditions (Smith, 1992, p. 57). This revival resembles a fundamental "amnesia" of global culture and is therefore temporary, tied to specific places and individuals. In many respects, the increased interest in the past and respect for ethno-national myths and traditions can be seen as a unique response of ethno-national groups to the unifying and leveling pressures created by the globalizing world.

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These pressures of globalization pose a particular problem for many young nations and nation-states struggling for nation-building. Indeed, the growing interest in local cultures and respect for ethnic myths stimulates the strengthening of national and ethnic communities, which to some extent hinders the development of a sense of national belonging. Young nation-states cannot fully utilize the proven European methods of consolidating national identity among their populations because most of these methods were directed towards ethnic assimilation and forced identity change in the name of the state and were openly violent in nature.

At the same time, while European states fought the "national question," there were no developed international organizations or institutions defending the rights of national minorities. In the contemporary world, however, the protection of minorities has become a global issue. Therefore, there is reason to argue that in young nation-states like Azerbaijan, the development of national identity is a sensitive issue requiring the nurturing of a sense of national belonging alongside democratic values, as well as a delicate balance and assessment of methods for resolving interethnic conflicts.

As noted above, collective memory plays an important role in defining ethnic and national communities and their relations with each other, which requires more detailed theoretical investigation.

## 1. Globalization and the Problem of National Identity

The landscape of civilizations in the world during the 20th century is presented paradoxically: on one hand, as a period of cataclysms and global upheavals that formed a new image of planet Earth, and on the other hand, as a period of significant losses. "Globalization and the intensive dialogue of cultures have led not only communities embedded in metropolises but also dominant societies defining modern development strategies to undergo substantial changes" (Zarov, 2014, p. 48). Today, the dominant civilizational processes are undoubtedly globalization processes. These processes are quite contradictory and have further intensified the problem of national identity.

According to G.V. Epifanova, globalization encompasses many characteristics of various global processes and represents a new phenomenon in human history, the modern world. It is not simply a continuation of earlier global integration trends (Epifanova, 2010, p. 69). Globalization is a worldwide process of economic, political, cultural, and religious integration and unification. K. Imanaliev defines globalization as "a process occurring at different speeds in three of the most important spheres of life: politics, culture, and economy" (Imanaliev, 2009, p. 47). The scholar argues that, first and foremost, globalization is the rapid formation of a unified global financial and information space, primarily based on new computer technologies. Globalization processes give rise to new social institutions in the new century, which must regulate social processes. Consequently, these processes challenge many established ideas.

Rapid changes at the turn of the 20th and 21st centuries have intensified the problem of national identity. S. Huntington emphasizes: "People and nations try to answer one of the most important questions a human can face: Who are we?" (Huntington, 1999, p. 532). This is also linked to the growing influence and extremely contradictory nature of globalization. Several globalization processes affect the intensification of the national identity problem: economization, democratization, informatization, and cultural standardization. These processes often confront national identity as an obstacle to progress.

National identity is a kind of core that encompasses strong ideas formed by ethnonational communities about themselves (Kortunov, 2009, p. 21). In the modern world, democratization means the transition to general rules of the game both in domestic and foreign policy. The state becomes a means of protecting the interests of society and individuals. In contemporary hierarchies, the individual comes first, society second, and the state third. If a state wishes to claim a significant role on the world stage, it must adhere to this hierarchy.

The economy also has a significant impact on national identity. In conditions where a unified global economic space is forming, national security and national development cannot exist separately. The only possible way to protect national interests is integration into the global economic space. Refusing integration means refusing development. If a state is not part of the global economic space, it cannot withstand competition. However, integration can sometimes lead to the erosion of national identity and its melting in

economic processes.

A unified global information space forms through informatization. Informatization creates a global network society that provides citizens access to material and spiritual goods contributing to continuous social development. Nevertheless, informatization is not an unconditional benefit. Information technologies create new opportunities for manipulating public consciousness and new threats to national identity. Moreover, global informatization may lead to the erosion of personality.

A consequence of information openness is cultural standardization. Globalization removes barriers between different cultures and causes worldwide competition. In such conditions, only those cultures that can quickly adapt to rapidly changing circumstances without losing their identity can survive. A clear example of such mobility is Japanese culture. Unfortunately, there are more negative than positive examples. Many cultures have failed to withstand the cultural unification attack caused by globalization. Thus, in the cultures of Spain, Mexico, Argentina, and many other countries, globalization has proven stronger than national identity. In these countries, only small national features remain — bullfighting in Spanish culture, Mexican cuisine in Mexican culture, Argentine tango in Argentine culture, Brazilian football in Brazilian culture. Clearly, after Mexico, Argentina, Spain, and Brazil, almost all European countries follow. Primarily, Central and Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Romania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. Germany, France, and Great Britain resist cultural unification processes more, largely because their cultures were historically formed much earlier. China, India, and Russia have cultures that are over a thousand years old and will resist globalization processes even more. However, this does not mean that cultural unification cannot absorb these three cultures. In each of these countries, the cultural core of national identity must quickly adapt to changes occurring in the economy, politics, and social life.

Thus, globalization tries to "crush" national distinctiveness and dissolve it in the processes of global economization, democratization, informatization, cultural standardization, and the universalization of values (Kortunov, 2009, p. 21). According to R. Robertson and H. Khodker, modern globalization sets a global framework that allows civilizations, regions, nation-states, and ethnic communities to reconstruct their history and identity (Robertson and Khodker, 1999).

Since the emergence of the globalization problem, the global scientific community has been discussing the inevitable assimilation of local civilizations by a unified global super-society. In their work "Globalization and Its Discontents," H.P. Martin and H. Schumann describe the possible consequences of globalization processes. They argue that everything is moving towards the formation of a global society called "20:80" in the near future: 80% of the population will serve and entertain the 20% that benefits from globalization (Martin and Schumann, 1997).

Another prevailing version of globalization outcomes is Westernization, or Americanization. Often, globalization processes are equated with Westernization, associated with the growing influence of the United States in the second half of the 20th century. The author understands Westernization as the unification of all countries under the patronage of a world superpower — the USA. Westernization can also be viewed as the USA's new colonial policy involving cultural expansion and economic dependence, with particular impacts on public consciousness.

Recently, the unprecedented growth of national self-awareness may be a defensive reaction against globalization and the standardization of social relations. Representatives of various ethnic groups feel that their national-cultural identity is under threat today. Strengthening anti-globalist trends in the modern world also stems from the fact that people, even if united, do not want to be part of some faceless common world; they strive to be representatives of very specific ethno-cultural, national communities.

"We already live in the era of globalism: the internet, laptops, ATMs, mobile phones, satellite communications and television, electronic cards, etc. In this sense, it is fundamentally impossible to deny the increasing scale of global development" (Imanaliev, 2009, p. 46). Is it possible to preserve sovereignty and identity in this process of losing religious and moral foundations?

## 1.1. Models of Globalization

Any civilization, society, or nation can exist only if it possesses distinctiveness, and national identity cannot exist without national customs and traditions. In conditions of globalization, the first component of national identity is the preservation of customs and traditions. The second component is participation in the globalization process, but the person's national identity must be respected. Large-scale tasks posed by global politics and economics should not blur national-cultural character. Otherwise, this would mean the dominance of a faceless mass culture.

Within the context of globalization, three models of national identity can be distinguished. The first model is Westernization. Countries adopting it (Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Bermuda Islands, Ireland) have chosen Western experience as a guide. Civil society in these countries began to be built based on the study of Western experience. All these countries are relatively recently independent former colonies (Sri Lanka in 1948, Ireland in 1922, Vietnam in 1945 but recognized by France in 1954, and Bermuda Islands still belong to Great Britain but have had internal self-government since 1968). Being a colony is more familiar to them than being a sovereign state.

The second model is modernization. India, South Korea, Malaysia, and Japan followed this model. The essence of this model lies in preserving centuries-old traditions while relying on a new technological base and innovations.

The third model is fundamentalist. This model is entirely aimed at rejecting the Western path of development. Countries choosing this model (Saudi Arabia, Turkmenistan, Iran, Belarus, Pakistan) strive to protect themselves from foreign disturbances and to develop in a specific way chosen by their political and religious leaders.

During the era of civilizational clashes, globalization processes characterized by increasing integration in all areas of social life increasingly affect modern society, thereby threatening the existence of nation-states.

The end of the 20th century and the first decade of the 21st century were marked by turbulent and contradictory events. This period is known as the era of widespread human rights ideas, political and national-cultural pluralism, and the beginning of international integration. However, this period also brought unprecedented sufferings and countless victims to humanity. Many conflicts that caused wars and large-scale terrorism had explicit national and religious motives. It seemed this period was a war era in which the inhabitants of planet Earth did not want to understand or respect each other or see universal ideals and values, thus destroying themselves. Nevertheless, a large and healthy part of human society aspired to peace and mutual understanding. It is no coincidence that UNESCO declared the first decade of the 21st century the decade of peace and culture of non-violence.

Many peoples live in the world, and the differences in their cultures and traditions require additional adequate knowledge, new methodological principles, values, and spiritual guidelines.

## 1.2. The Crisis of Culture in World Experience

The dynamic transformations of modernity assign a special role to culture. In the context of increasing contradictions between various countries and regions—primarily due to some nations' geopolitical ambitions and others' search for effective measures to ensure national security and sovereignty—culture is used to achieve different goals depending on the ideological positions of global actors. Western European countries, especially the United States, support the "American model" of globalization and claim that this model reflects the most progressive achievements of human consciousness, as well as being exemplary in political, economic, and social spheres. Consequently, for them, culture becomes one of the instruments for expressing the spiritual world and value orientations of various nations and religious affiliations.

Several research centers in Western countries are engaged in forming a new interethnic ideology—"netism" (or "cyberliberalism")—which is based on the desire to disseminate a spontaneous information flow under the control of the ideologists of the "chosen" world hegemony during the information exchange process. Mass culture, originally created as an ideological system (paradigm) with the aim of spreading and promoting globalization, is essentially part of this system. In other words, this cultural form was built to become one of the main "agents" of globalization. Its spread, especially considering the functional

capabilities of the internet space, provides the opportunity to ideologically influence broad masses of people regardless of their national and socio-cultural choices.

This culture increasingly exhibits the characteristics of a "global consumer culture," where "the criterion of success is not spiritual values but profit and mass success in the increasingly monopolized entertainment industry" (Babosov, 2011, p. 125).

The phenomenon of mass culture, its psychological impact, and the mental state of people under the powerful attack of the overwhelming information flow represent a systemic crisis primarily expressed in a crisis of values, followed by a crisis of national identity and culture.

Many thinkers saw the foundation of the theory of values in moral relations linked both to the relevant norms and traditions of the socio-cultural environment and to the ethical principles of faith and corresponding moral ideals. The ideological core of modern globalization ideology is the idea of "universal human values." In the context of the current systemic crisis, especially the cultural crisis, there are various approaches to understanding the essence of universal values and the category of "value" itself.

Some approaches demonstrate loyalty to ideals of faith, traditional moral and ethical standards. Some globalization proponents support the weakening of the secular meaning of faith, call on people to abandon traditional moral standards, and especially urge young people to believe that traditional principles of faith are outdated, have lost their usefulness, and that new values should be directed toward modern goals.

Prominent thinkers of the 20th century, witnesses of the "system crisis" sweeping Western countries, such as F. Spengler, A. Toynbee, and K. Jaspers, expressed their concerns about humanity's future, noting the destructive power of the coming crisis. P. A. Sorokin was the first to note the decline of Western culture and society. He saw the essence of the extraordinary crisis in the fact that humanity is between two eras: the dying culture of sensation and the emerging new culture of ideas.

The diagnosis of the historical process, understood as social and cultural dynamics and development and change of socio-cultural systems based on the idea of the change of types of culture, appears in P. A. Sorokin's reflections as follows:

"The most important aspects of the life, lifestyle, and culture of Western society are experiencing a serious and severe spiritual crisis... It is as if we are between two eras—the dying sensual culture of our brilliant yesterday and the future culture of ideas... The rays of the setting sun still illuminate the grandeur of the past, but the light is gradually fading, and in this darkness everything seems more difficult to us. The night of this transitional period begins to descend upon us with its nightmares, terrifying shadows, and painful horrors, but beyond its limits, we can see the dawn of a new great culture of ideas, which will greet a new generation—the people of the future" (Sorokin and Man, 1992).

At the foundation of this new "great culture of the future," P. A. Sorokin placed the value principles of faith in human creative and constructive desires and the hope for humanity's spiritual reconstruction during the transition to a new socio-cultural supersystem. He emphasized the importance of the special mission of humanitarians called to explain the essence of the crisis, writing:

"If humanity manages to avoid the catastrophe of greater world wars, then future generations of people will have to greet the dawn of a new magnificent consciousness" (Sorokin, 2000, p. 11).
Sorokin's idea that the inevitable replacement of the era of the culture of sensation with the new era of the culture of ideas is becoming more realistic is gaining traction. I. Wallerstein writes:

"In 2050 or 2075, we will only be certain of a few things: we will no longer live under the capitalist world economy but will develop within the framework of a new order or a certain new historical system or systems" (Wallerstein, 2003, p. 49).

However, whether the contradictions of globalization, threats to world stability, and war dangers will deepen in this new "world system" or peace will prevail depends, indeed, on world civilization represented by a diversity of national communities with different religious and philosophical foundations, customs, traditions, and innovations (Kuleshov and Medushevsky, 2001).

At the base of the American model of globalization is a human deprived of cultural identity and focused solely on consumption, including spiritual nourishment. As V. P. Dobrenkov noted, globalization

"creates a zombie-like person deprived of historical memory, detached from national roots, customs, and traditions, forgetful of kinship, and indifferent to their homeland" (Dobrenkov, 2011, p. 24).

With the increase of tendencies toward the "Westernization" of world civilization, cultural and value confrontations between peoples intensify, and many peoples' desire to preserve their national-cultural identity grows.

The clash of two opposing tendencies in the dynamics of the globalization process reveals the essence of globalization contradictions, as the American hegemony "leads to the revival of non-Western cultures worldwide" (Huntington, 2003, p. 130).

The contradictions of cultures during the transition period in the modern world indicate that the revival and development of national cultures can be perceived not as a clash of civilizations but as harmony. Such harmony is possible only on the basis of mutual interaction, diversity, and complementarity of national cultures.

## 2. Collective Memory and Identity

As E. Smith writes, to develop national identity, a society must "know who it is, where it comes from, and where it is going" (Smith, 1995, p. 99). To achieve this, individuals who are members of the society collect separate stories about the past and turn them into coherent narratives, which become shared common stories accepted by the inhabitants of a particular state. Through common stories unique to a specific society, which recognize themselves both in their past and present, feelings of belonging and affiliation to that particular society can arise—this forms the basis of national identity.

At the same time, these shared stories about the past, accepted by the members of any society, constitute a form of collective memory. It can also be defined as a set of concrete ideas about the past, reflecting the common sense prevailing in a given society at a particular historical moment and shared by the majority. Issues related to the formation of the nation have been partly addressed through various means such as teaching a unified national history in schools, using mass media, producing historical films, writing historical novels, holding historical exhibitions, and so on.

It is known that the past can sometimes cause confusion, and the same historical fact can be presented in a way that leads the reader to completely opposite conclusions. Everything depends on the goals set by the authors of historical works, their choice of the appropriate "perspective," and their intellectual currents. In this sense, the choice of perspective that determines the content of such works is made by national elites—"not the lower classes, who demand fundamental principles of 'who is the villain, who is the hero,' but them." The discussion concerns the "memory politics" and "identity politics" conducted by political elites within society to build the nation.

As mentioned above, achieving and preserving national distinctiveness in multinational states is an extremely complex issue—especially when ethnic groups possess contradictory collective memories and collective histories. We consider it important to empirically study the relationship between the collective memories of Azerbaijani youth from various ethnic groups and the level of development of their internal national identity.

There are heated debates in the scientific community regarding the definition of collective memory. One of the creators of the concept of collective memory, the French sociologist M. Halbwachs, viewed collective memory as the shared memory of a common past preserved by representatives of a specific group, social stratum, or nation (Halbwachs, 1992, p. 133). Some researchers who developed this idea argue that collective memory should be distinguished both from individual memory and from memory based on individual remembrance. According to the criterion of reproduction integrity, collective memory is considered a process arising from the need to recall the "lost" past and is a highly controversial and obstructed process within society (Pennebaker and others, 1997).

Since the 1980s, the term "collective memory" has become widespread and is often used together with the category "collective identity." This is based on the belief of many researchers that social and cultural symbols (texts, images, rituals) contribute to the formation of both collective memory and collective identity (Poole, 2008, p.151). At the same time, the hierarchical and multi-level structure of

collective identity is emphasized, for example, at individual, small social group, and national levels—each having its own unique collective memory structures. These levels can exist in mutual harmony or conflict by creating contradictory structures.

It should be noted that the subject we are discussing has only been studied to a limited extent, and published research does not resolve the issue of how collective memory structures affect membership in various social groups.

In this context, studies on the characteristics of collective memory found among members of different ethnic groups within a single large social group—a nation—appear to have not only practical but also valuable scientific-theoretical results, which allow us to better understand the interrelation between collective memory structures and patterns of national identity. Our investigation of the relationship between collective memory and identity categories is based on some assumptions of H. Tajfel's social identity theory (Tajfel, 1981, p.147) and J. Tuvnev's self-classification theory (Tuvnev, 1985, p.80). Personal and social identity are formed by an individual's understanding of their position within certain social groups, the value attributed to that position, and the emotional significance attached to it.

Memory preserves or revives memories that support an individual's positive identity at both personal and social levels. In this context, the value of collective memory is measured by the extent to which it contributes to an individual's sense of belonging to a particular social group or culture and to the feeling of national identity. Therefore, understanding the content of collective memory among individuals from different ethnic groups within the national group is very important, as it allows a better comprehension of the perspectives and directions involved in the processes of national identity.

### 2.1. Experimental Methodology

One hundred students aged 14-17, both male and female, from three different ethnic groups (Azerbaijanis, Lezgins, and Talysh) living in three different regions of the country (Baku, Qusar, and Astara) were individually surveyed using a specially prepared questionnaire. First, participants were asked to name the three most significant events that happened in their homeland over the last 100 years. The questionnaire included events from the past (represented by the names of historical figures), and participants were asked to briefly describe them. The responses reflected the characteristics of collective memory and how participants perceive history.

The questionnaire included the following questions:

1. To what extent do you feel similar to other Azerbaijani citizens?
2. How important is being an Azerbaijani citizen to you?
3. When you hear criticism of Azerbaijani residents from a non-citizen, to what extent do you feel similarity to the criticized person?
4. How strong is your sense of connection with other Azerbaijani citizens?
5. To what extent do you feel similar to other Muslims?
6. How important is being a Muslim to you?
7. When you hear criticism of Muslims from a non-Muslim, to what extent do you sympathize with the criticism?
8. How strong is your sense of connection with Muslims from other ethnic groups living in Azerbaijan?

Participants from different ethnic groups mostly gave the same or similar answers. If we consider all the events they identified as a general measure of collective memory, this list can be seen as evidence of the relative consistency of the participants' collective memory.

The most accurate answers concerned events such as "Khojaly" and "January 20." This shows that these events are firmly rooted in the participants' collective memory and this is not coincidental. These events, which had a strong traumatic impact on the population, are among the most tragic in Azerbaijan's recent history. Numerous studies show that traumatic, stressful, and emotionally intense experiences are more deeply embedded in collective memory than others. Researchers explain this by the higher likelihood that people with strong emotional experiences share their experiences with others. This broadens the circle of people who remember and retell trauma-related events, which in turn leads to the formation of collective

memory about specific events. Certainly, the impact of educational programs that include information about these events (such as annual state-level commemorations and school memorial days) is also significant. There were also quite a few incorrect answers about the "Black January" events (often confused with the subsequent Armenian occupation). This is an unfortunate indication of deficiencies in the methods of teaching history in secondary schools.

The third most accurate answer was related to Haji Zeynalabdin Taghiyev, a prominent Azerbaijani oil industrialist and philanthropist who lived at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century. The fourth most correct answer was the "Contract of the Century." It seems that the media's constant coverage of Azerbaijan's oil contracts contributed to the strengthening of this event in the participants' collective memory. The ethnic factor was evident in recalling answers related to "Black January," the "Contract of the Century," "Azerbaijan People's Republic," and "Mammad Amin Rasulzadeh." Specifically, Azerbaijani participants gave the most accurate answers about these events and figures.

Based on the results, it can be concluded that the collective memory of Azerbaijan's increasing ethnic groups contains a relative sense of "belonging" and "affiliation" regarding some significant and tragic events related to the country's independence. Overall, participants from all three ethnic groups demonstrated a high level of national and religious identity. Interestingly, the highest levels of national identity were found among Talysh students, while the highest levels of religious identity were among Lezgin students. How can these results be explained?

As noted above, the Azerbaijani group participants were students from Baku schools, whereas Lezgin and Talysh participants attended rural schools. This factor undoubtedly affected the indicators of national and religious identity. After all, Baku, the capital and largest city of the republic, is more exposed to the influence of the globalizing world, which explains the lower levels of national and religious identity among Azerbaijani students.

The results obtained during the study are consistent with our hypothesis that groups within nations that share a "mutually consistent" collective memory exhibit similar or identical patterns of national identity.

The study results show that Azerbaijanis, Lezgins, and Talysh all demonstrated a high degree of harmony between national identity and collective memory, but the level of history education in schools is unsatisfactory and does not contribute to the development of analytical skills. Based on modern knowledge and understanding of ethnic conflicts, nationalism, national development, and nation-building, it is important to develop historical tools and concepts that allow for the scientific analysis of each historical period.

Finally, national state policy is needed to help form a qualitatively new level of Azerbaijani national identity and collective memory. This will strengthen the sense of national identity among all ethnic groups living in multicultural Azerbaijan, who are ready to identify themselves as "Azerbaijani" and take pride in it.

## CONCLUSION

In the modern world, globalization processes lead to serious crises in culture. These crises are mainly related to the weakening of national identity and collective memory. Certain models of globalization, especially Western and American types, seek to reduce national and cultural differences, promoting universal, sometimes "Americanized" cultural values. This leads to people distancing themselves from national affiliations and value systems, becoming disconnected from their roots and historical memory.

National identity and collective memory form the foundation of peoples' cultures, and their weakening results in crises of values and losses in national and cultural identity. This process creates deep socio-cultural tensions at both individual and societal levels. Because the "American" model of globalization aims to weaken and homogenize national-cultural differences, it sometimes leads to cultural conflicts and even ethnic-national conflicts. The rapid development of information technologies intensifies ideological influence on national values and deepens the crisis of values further.

From a historical perspective, this situation, as emphasized by P. A. Sorokin, is an inevitable stage

in the transition from the old "sensate culture" to a new "ideational culture." This transformation creates both great challenges and new opportunities for humanity. Overcoming the cultural crisis is possible not only by preserving national traditions and values but also through dialogue and mutual respect among different cultures. Accepting cultural diversity as a rich and complementary element is the main perspective toward the harmony, rather than clash, of civilizations.

In this regard, the protection of national sovereignty and cultural identity, as well as developing strategic approaches to benefit from the positive aspects of globalization, are of great importance. An inclusive cultural model open to innovations and based on universal values is the guarantee of peace, justice, and sustainable development.

In conclusion, resolving the cultural crisis requires systematic work on global cooperation, harmonious interaction among different cultures, and protection of national values. This is a fundamental condition not only for preserving the cultural and ethnic richness of different peoples but also for humanity's universal development and a more stable, just future.

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# A HİSTORY OF LOCATİON İN ANCİENT AZERBAİJAN: ATROPATENE

**Nimet SÖNMEZ OKULMUŞ**[*]

**ABSTRACT**

The name Atropatene is one of the place names that has survived from antiquity to the present day. An examination of ancient sources reveals that Atropatene derives from the ruler Atropatos. He defended the region against the Macedonians and subsequently declared himself king. According to ancient sources, Atropatene, which gave its name to the region, is a region located east of Matiane, west of Greater Media, and south and southeast of the Caspian Sea. Although not perfectly equivalent in this respect, it can be roughly placed in the region of Southern Azerbaijan. An examination of the region's ancient history reveals human settlement from the Paleolithic era to the present. However, the region's written history begins with the Assyrian and Urartian periods. Based on Assyrian and Urartian sources, it can be concluded that the region was rich. Therefore, it can be argued that these kingdoms engaged in expeditions to access these riches. Based on Assyrian sources, it can be concluded that the land of Manna was divided between the Assyrians and Urartians, but that the region came under Assyrian rule after Sargon II. Our article examines the primary sources of the period, Assyrian and Urartian written texts, and evaluates place names to identify ancient settlements in the Southern Azerbaijan region. This demonstrates that the area around Lake Urmia, in particular, witnessed dense settlement.

**Keywords:** Atropatene, Lake Urmiye, East Azerbaijan, Sargon II, Manna.

## INTRODUCTİON

Atropatene was one of the important regions of the Caucasus area and can be traced in ancient sources. Strabo constitutes one of the principal sources that provide significant information about Atropatene. When the eleventh book of his work Geographica, in which he describes the land of Media, is examined, the following statements can be observed (Akbulut, 2025, p. 81):

"This country (Atropatian Media) lies to the east of Armenia and Matiane, to the west of Greater Media, and to the north of both. It extends around the bay of the Hyrcanian Sea and is adjacent to Matiane in the south. Judging by its power, Atropatian Media is by no means a small country. According to Apollonides, it is able to field 10,000 cavalry and about 40,000 infantry. It has a lake called Kapauta, in which salt crystallizes and hardens. This salt causes itching and pain, but the remedy for this condition is raw olive oil… They recover what is taken from them, just as they took back Symbake from the Armenians who had become subject to the Romans. Subsequently, they sought friendship with Caesar and at the same time showed closeness to the Parthians."

When this passage transmitted by Strabo is evaluated from the perspective of historical geography, the place referred to as the Hyrcanian Sea appears as the ancient name of the region extending to the south and south-east of the Caspian Sea (Çoban, 2023, p. 805). Matiane, on the other hand, is located to the east or south of Lake Urmia (Syme, 1988, p. 138 and footnote 7). While Atropatene was situated between Armenia and the shores of Lake Urmia, it was also adjacent to the region lying to the south and south-east of the Caspian Sea. From this perspective, it is possible to state that it included the area known today as Southern Azerbaijan (Iranian Azerbaijan).

**Map I:** Atropatene and Albania

*(K. Farrokh (2024), "An Analysis of the Military History and Martial Culture of Ancient Iran and the Caucasus in the pre-Islamic Era",* Hunara: Journal of Ancient Iranian Arts and History\*, 2/2, pp. 7–62).\*

Since Atropatene is also closely associated with Atropates, it is necessary to address this issue. Indeed, Media and Atropatios are interconnected concepts. Strabo provides the following information on this subject in his work *Geographica* (Akbulut, 2025, p. 81):

"Media is divided into two parts. The first is called Greater Media, whose metropolis is the great city of Ecbatana, which contains the royal palace of the Median Empire (even today the Parthians continue to use it as a royal residence. Because Media is cold, kings spend the summer here; their winter residence is Seleuceia on the Tigris near Babylon). The other part is Atropatian Media, which takes its name from the commander Atropates. He defended this country, which had been a part of Greater Media, from the Macedonians. Moreover, after being proclaimed king, he organized this land as an independent state. This achievement has been preserved by his successors to the present day…"

As can be understood from Strabo's account, Atropatene derived its name from the commander Atropates. After defending the region from the Macedonians, he later declared himself king, thus establishing a separate state in the area. Houtsma, in the entry on Azerbaijan in the *First Encyclopaedia of Islam*, states that this region in antiquity constituted the Greater Media area of the Achaemenid Empire, but in the period following Alexander the Great it became an independent satrapy called Atropatene, named after the Persian satrap Atropates. He further notes that the dynasty preserved itself until the Christian era (Houtsma, 1987, p. 134). Xavier de Planhol, in the *Encyclopaedia Iranica* under the heading "Azerbaijan" in the Geography section, remarks that the country's name derived from the satrap of Media Atropates, that he retained his position in western Media during the time of Alexander the Great, and that the region was incorporated into the Persian Empire during the reign of the Sasanian king Shapur I (Planhol, 1987, p. 205).

In this respect, when ancient sources and the views of modern scholars are evaluated together, it is possible to state that the term "Azerbaijan" is a legacy of Atropatene that evolved over time into its present form. This article aims to examine the ancient history of this region. The primary sources of the study consist of written texts from the relevant period, while the works of modern scholars are used as secondary sources.

### 1. Ancient History of Southern Azerbaijan up to the End of the Assyrian Period

Scientific studies conducted in Southern Azerbaijan (Iranian Azerbaijan) indicate that the region possesses a very ancient past. A review of this research shows that between 1932 and 1933 the French scholar Jacques Demurgan carried out investigations around Lake Urmia (Karimikiya, Rezaloo, Abedi & Javanmardzadeh, 2022, p. 5). Furthermore, between June and November 1949 Carlton S. Cook discovered four settlement sites, two of which were located in the Zagros Mountains. These included Hunter's Cave in the Bisotun Cave in Kermanshah Province in southwestern Iran and the Tamtama Cave overlooking Lake Urmia in Southern Azerbaijan. The finds obtained from the archaeological excavations at these sites were dated to the Middle and Upper Palaeolithic periods (Bazgir, 2017, p. 3). In his 1957 excavations at Tamtama, which he stated was situated one to two miles from Lake Urmia, Cook reported finding only seven pieces of flint, none of which were worked (Cook, 1957, p. 126). On this basis, it is possible to trace the history of the region back to the Palaeolithic period.

Settlement in the region is not limited to these examples. Another site in Southern Azerbaijan is Dava Göz, a small area measuring approximately 100 × 100 m located 15 km southeast of Khoy and to the north of Lake Urmia (Map II).



**Map II.** Dava Göz, Lake Urmia and Southern Azerbaijan

*(A. Abedi, "Iranian Azerbaijan Pathway from the Zagros to the Caucasus, Anatolia and Northern Mesopotamia: Dava Göz, A New Neolithic and Chalcolithic Site in NW Iran",* Mediterranean Archaeology and Archaeometry*, 17/1, pp. 69–87).\**

Excavations carried out in the area designated as Trench III at Dava Göz have revealed finds dating to the Late Neolithic / Early Chalcolithic period. In Trench V, materials attributed to the Late Chalcolithic

period were uncovered. Within this framework, Dava Göz III is dated to approximately 4200–3900/3800 BCE (Abedi, 2017, pp. 69–87).

At Göy Tepe, located in West Azerbaijan in Iran, studies conducted by Burton Brown indicate that the Göy Tepe B period may belong to the middle of the second millennium BCE (Brown, 1951, p. 141). Accordingly, it is possible to state in general terms that the region has been inhabited since the Palaeolithic period.

Both Urartian and Assyrian sources provide information on the written history of the region. The Urartian state was formed in the mid-tenth century BCE as a result of economic consolidation and the pressure exerted by Assyria on the Uruatri and Nairi confederations (Tarhan, 1978, p. 1ff.; Sevin, 2012, p. 44; Tarhan, 1982, p. 69). Urartian inscriptions show that during the co-reign of Išpuini and Menua, campaigns against foreign lands were initiated. For example, an inscription on the wall of the Kalatgah Dam states that the king advanced toward the land of Sapaili, while another inscription located in the Surp Pogos Church in the ancient city of Van records victories over the tribes of Luša and Katarza (Payne, 2006, p. 35).

An examination of Urartian inscriptions also indicates campaigns conducted in the vicinity of Lake Urmia. For instance, Ab/purza(ne) is located on the eastern shore of Lake Urmia, Alate in the mountainous area south of the lake, Arha/u/o to the south of Lake Urmia, and Gaduqaniu within Satiraraja to the east of the lake (Dianokoff & Kashkai, 1981, pp. 3, 5, 10, 65). When the Horhor Annals of the Urartian king Argishti I are examined, one of his campaigns to the region is described as follows:

"Argishti, son of Minua, declares: the god Haldi is mighty, and the spear of the god Haldi is mighty. By the greatness of Haldi I sent forth my commanders on campaign. I pursued the Assyrians… I went on campaign to my land Dada and against … I marched to the land of Arha… I campaigned against the land of Bustu. I captured the city of Aburza… I seized the city of Qaduqaniu… I advanced as far as the mountainous land of Mana. 18,827 people were taken captive in that year. Some I killed, others I carried off alive. I drove away 606 horses, 184 camels, 6,257 head of cattle and 33,203 sheep and goats…" (Payne, 2006, p. 164).

An analysis of this text dating to the reign of Argishti I indicates that the king campaigned in a region encompassing Southern Azerbaijan. As noted above, Aburza and Qaduqaniu are located in the vicinity of Lake Urmia, while Arha is situated to the south of the lake near the land of Bustu (Dianokoff & Kashkai, 1981, p. 10). The booty obtained during the campaign suggests that the region was economically prosperous and that animal husbandry occupied a prominent place in its economy.

Although Argishti I states that he captured several cities, other campaigns were also carried out in the region during his reign. The Horhor inscription records that he campaigned against the land of Mana and captured the land of Irkiuni, resulting in the seizure of 6,471 captives, 286 horses, 2,251 head of cattle and 8,205 small livestock as booty. In another campaign, he is said to have captured the Asqaiai Valley (Payne, 2006, pp. 165, 168). The land of Mana is roughly located to the east and west of Lake Urmia, while Asqaiai is placed on the southern shore of the lake and identified with Uski on the northern slope of Mount Sahand, west of modern Tabriz (Dianokoff & Kashkai, 1981, pp. 13–14, 54).

On the basis of this evidence, it is possible to state that during the reign of Argishti I a part of Southern Azerbaijan came under Urartian domination. The numerous toponyms mentioned in the texts also suggest the absence of a strong centralized kingdom in the region at that time. Moreover, Urartian campaigns into Southern Azerbaijan were not limited to the reign of Argishti I; similar expeditions are also known to have been undertaken during the reign of his successor, Sarduri II.

## 2. Campaigns during the Reign of Sarduri II and Assyrian–Manna Relations

An inscription consisting of seven columns was discovered on a stele and base placed in a rock-cut niche known as Hazine Kapı and Analıkız, dating to the reign of Sarduri II. In the first part of the text, the king states that he set out on campaign and captured the land of Mana (Payne, 2006, p. 208). Another campaign to the region is recorded on the reverse side of the same stele as follows (Payne, 2006, p. 213):

"To the god Haldi, to the god Teisheba, to the god Shivini, and to all the gods of the land of Biainili, I prayed. The gods listened to me and guided me. I set out and went on campaign against the land of Puluadi. The enemy army confronted me in battle. I drove them back and pursued them as far as the city of Libliune. I captured the fortified royal city of Libliune by force. There I erected an inscription. I burned the cities and devastated the land."

An examination of the text shows that two additional toponyms were added to the Urartian corpus. According to the inscription, Puluadi was a territorial entity and Libliune its royal city. Puluadi is located in present-day Southern Azerbaijan, near the village of Seghendel, 5 km east of Varzaghan and about 30 km west of Ahar, while its royal city Libliune is likewise placed at Seghendel (Dianokoff & Kashkai, 1981, pp. 50, 64). The Analıkız stele also mentions a campaign against the land of Quʾalbani (Payne, 2006, p. 230). On the basis of Urartian inscriptions, it is therefore possible to state that Southern Azerbaijan was incorporated into Urartian domination during the reign of Sarduri II.

With regard to the Assyrians, the land of Manna appears for the first time in inscriptions dating to the reign of Shalmaneser III (Mutlu, 2017, p. 229). The Black Obelisk, discovered at Calah in 1846 and belonging to Shalmaneser III, records a campaign conducted against Manna. The relevant passage reads as follows (Grayson, 2002, pp. 69–70):

"In my thirtieth regnal year, while I was residing in Calah, I gave orders and sent out Dāian-Aššur, the field marshal, chief of my extensive army, at the head of my army. Crossing the River Zab he approached the cities belonging to the city Hubuškia… Moving on from the cities of the land Madahisa he approached the cities of Udaku, the Mannaean. Udaku the Mannaean took fright in the face of the flash of my strong weapons and abandoned Zirtu, his royal city, and ran away to save his life. I went after him and carried off his oxen, sheep, and property without measure…"

This text shows that during the reign of Shalmaneser III a ruler named Udaku governed Manna and fled before the advancing Assyrian army. The king did not limit his activities to this single campaign: in the thirty-first year of his reign, he again marched against Manna and extracted tribute from several cities, mainly in the form of cattle, sheep, and well-trained horses (Grayson, 2002, p. 83).

Following Shalmaneser III, further expeditions were undertaken in the region during the reign of Shamshi-Adad V. According to information contained on a large stone stele at Calah, the king crossed the River Zab in his third regnal year and received tribute from several lands, including Manna and Parsua (Grayson, 2002, p. 184).

It is known that Argishti I's control over Manna continued until Tiglath-pileser III ascended the Assyrian throne (Mutlu, 2017, p. 230; Salvini, 2006, pp. 70–71). Assyrian sources indicate that at times the Mannaean king sought Assyrian assistance against the Urartians, while at other times he rebelled against Assyrian authority. For example, during the reign of Rusa I, Manna was under Assyrian protection and its ruler Iranzu requested assistance from Assyria. At that time Sargon II was on the Assyrian throne and personally intervened to suppress the rebellion (Sever, 2008, p. 104).

Texts from the reign of Sargon II show that Assyria resumed large-scale campaigns in the region. Inscriptions from the interior of Sargon II's palace at Dur-Šarrukin state that the king conquered regions such as Media, Parsua, and Manna and received tribute from them (Frame, 2021, p. 56). Nevertheless, the region was not brought completely under Assyrian control. One text describes an episode from Sargon II's reign as follows (Frame, 2021, pp. 59–60):

"[In my sixth regnal year, Ur]sa (Rusa), [the Ura]rtian, [sent his mounted messenger with a

mendacious message to Bag-dati of the land Uisdis and … the governors] of the land Mannea. They brought about the rout of the Manneans on Mount Uaus … and threw down the corpse of Aza, their lord. I raised my hands in supplication to the god Aššur, my lord, to avenge the Manneans and make that area part of Assyria. On Mount Uaus … I flayed the skin from Bag-dati and displayed it to the Manneans… Ullusunu, his brother, who had sat on the royal throne, put his trust in Rusa the Urartian … I overwhelmed the city Izirtu, the royal city of the land of Mannea… Ullusunu, the Mannean, together with his whole land, grasped my feet. I then had pity on them and pardoned Ullusunu's crimes and allowed him to sit again on his throne."

According to this Assyrian account, in Sargon II's sixth regnal year the Urartian king Rusa incited Bag-dati, ruler of Manna, against Assyria. Sargon II responded with a campaign in which Bag-dati was killed and his body displayed to the Mannaeans. His brother Ullusunu continued the revolt with Urartian support but was eventually defeated and compelled to seek mercy from Sargon, who pardoned him and allowed him to retain the throne.

However, Assyrian texts also indicate that Ullusunu did not remain loyal. In the seventh year of his reign Sargon II reports that Ullusunu had deceived him, leading to the seizure of twenty-two fortresses, which were annexed to Assyrian territory, while the Mannaean governor Dayukku was deported with his family and order was restored in the troubled land of Mannea (Frame, 2021, pp. 60–61).

Although Assyrian sources claim that peace was restored, the situation appears to have remained unstable. In the eighth year of his reign Sargon II records that he defeated Rusa again, capturing 260 members of the royal family and cavalry, while Rusa himself escaped. At the same time, he removed the district of Uisdis from Mannea and granted it to Ullusunu (Frame, 2021, p. 65). This suggests that the land of Mannea was divided between Assyrian and Urartian spheres of influence, but that following Rusa's defeat the region eventually passed into Assyrian control.

The struggle between Assyria and Urartu in the region can largely be explained by economic motives. Sargon II states that he received from Ullusunu of Mannea, Dalta of Ellipi, Beʾl-aplu-iddina of Allabria, and forty-five powerful Median cities a total of 4,609 horses, mules, cattle, lambs, and goats (Frame, 2021, p. 68). This indicates that Southern Azerbaijan was a region of considerable wealth.

Between 642 and 625 BCE an alliance was formed between the Scythians, the Mannaeans, the Medes, and the Babylonians against Assyria (Erdemir & Erdemir, 2010, p. 29; Mutlu, 2017, p. 234). Ultimately, Assyria collapsed after Babylonian and Median forces besieged and captured Nineveh, killing King Sin-šar-iškun. Although a short-lived ruler named Aššur-uballiṭ II emerged in Harran, he was soon expelled by the Medes and Babylonians, and the Assyrian state came to an end in 609 BCE (Frahm, 2017, p. 192).

**CONCLUSION**

When Atropatene is evaluated as a geographical region, it can broadly be located in what is today Southern Azerbaijan. This area, also referred to as Iranian Azerbaijan, lies within the territory of modern Iran and includes Lake Urmia. Archaeological research conducted in the region demonstrates that its ancient history extends back to the Palaeolithic period. Since the region was also inhabited during the Neolithic and Chalcolithic periods, it may be stated that it witnessed continuous human presence throughout different stages of prehistory.

By contrast, the written history of the region begins considerably later. The surviving textual sources originate not from Atropatene itself but from Urartian and Assyrian campaigns conducted in order to exploit its wealth. The first Assyrian expeditions to the area can be dated to the reign of Shalmaneser III, as the land of Manna is located by Dianokoff to the east and west of Lake Urmia. It may therefore be argued that the Assyrians became acquainted with Southern Azerbaijan during the reign of Shalmaneser III. These campaigns, however, were relatively short-lived. Although Manna is mentioned again under Shamshi-Adad V, it was the Urartians who initiated sustained campaigns against Southern Azerbaijan during the reign of

Argishti I, which continued under Sarduri II. The available evidence indicates that during the reign of Rusa I a portion of Southern Azerbaijan, including the area around Lake Urmia, came under Urartian control. An analysis of Urartian inscriptions reveals the existence of numerous settlements, some of which can be broadly placed within the boundaries of Southern Azerbaijan. This domination, however, appears to have been brief, since under Sargon II the region passed fully into Assyrian hands.

During the reign of Sargon II, Rusa I is known to have attempted to incite revolts in the land of Manna, but these uprisings were suppressed by the Assyrian king and thus failed. Following the collapse of the Assyrian state, it is possible to state that the region ceased to be under Assyrian control.

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**Reconstructing the Past: Journal of Historical Studies | Volume 3
Number 4 December 2025 - 47p.**